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Abstract

Digital signatures are used for proving the authorship of a given message. It is an
important primitive of modern cryptography. To verify a signature, a user has to
be equipped with a valid public key of the signer. A public key certificate issued
by a trusted third party is required for public key authentication. It is necessary to
verify the validity of a public key prior to verifying a signature, through a Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI). However, the complexity of certificate management [ARP03]
is a problem. Although the notion of identity-based signatures [Sha85] is introduced
as a solution, key escrow is still an inherent problem.
The efficiency of a signature scheme and the size of a signature are two important
aspects in evaluating a signature scheme. Taking PKI-based ring signature schemes
as an example, they are inefficient in a large scale of applications [ALSY07]. This
is due to the transport and verification costs of public key certificates. Low computational cost for signature signing and verification processes is required in practice.
This thesis provides an efficient scheme to solve public key certificate management
and key escrow problems, and reduce the communication cost of ring signature
schemes.
To eliminate the need of public key certificates from traditional PKI and the
problem of key escrow in identity-based cryptography, the concept of self-certified
public keys was put forth by Girault [Gir91]. In this thesis, we propose an efficient
and novel self-certified signature scheme, which requires only one modular multiplication in signing with pre-computation. One of the features of our scheme lies in its
batch verification in both single-signer and multi-signer settings. Pairing computations in the batch verification are independent from the number of signatures. Our
scheme is proved to be secure in the random oracle model.
Two similar solutions of the certificate management problem and the key escrow
problem were proposed in 2003, namely certificateless public key cryptography and
certificate-based cryptography. In the signing process, both of them require two
v

pieces of information where one is from a trusted third party and the other is chosen
by a user itself. The validity of a user’s public key is implicitly verified during the
signature verification. However, it is different in self-certified signature schemes. The
user’s public key can not only be implicitly verified in the verification algorithm, but
can also be computed explicitly. The computational cost of signature verification is
reduced since there is no need to verify the user’s public key after a valid key has
been recovered. However, in the either certificateless signature schemes or certificatebased signature schemes, public key verifications are indispensable.
We also present a new notion called self-certified ring signatures (SCRS), to
provide an alternative solution to the certificate management problem in ring signatures and eliminate the key escrow problem in identity-based ring signatures. A
precise definition and elaborated security model of SCRS are provided, along with a
concrete construction. We prove that our proposed scheme is secure in the random
oracle model. This scheme captures all features of ring signatures, and exhibits the
advantages of low storage, communication and computation cost.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Cryptography is originally a study of information hiding which provides the secrecy
of data by outputting a secret code. The procedure is called the data encryption. To
protect the confidentiality of a message, a secret code needs to satisfy a requirement
that the plaintext can only be found by a user who holds a valid key. Cryptography
has been widely employed for secure communications. However, with the development of more sophisticated techniques of attack and security requirements, more
complex structures and types of cryptographic algorithms are required.
In modern cryptography, the security of a cryptographic scheme normally depends on mathematical theory. The notion of mathematical cryptography was firstly
put forth by Shannon in 1949 [Sha49]. Basically, most of modern cryptographic algorithms or protocols are used for protecting the security of a communication channel.
That is, during a communication between Alice and Bob, deployed cryptographic
techniques have to prevent any malicious third party from damaging the transport
of data or deciphering secret messages. Generally speaking, four security requirements that are required for secure communication are [Bon04]: 1) No one can read
the secret content except an authorized user; 2) A sender can prove his/her identity
to a receiver; 3) A message cannot be modified by an unauthorized party, otherwise
a user can detect and reject the message; 4) A user who sent a message cannot
deny the ownership of the message. To satisfy these security requirements, data
encryption and digital signatures, have been widely studied and employed.
Two branches in modern cryptography are symmetric-key cryptography and public key cryptography. In symmetric-key cryptographic schemes, since both a sender
and a receiver share the same secret key, the property of message confidentiality is
provided. It cannot however provide the identity of a key holder. In other words,
symmetric-key algorithms normally do not satisfy the last three security requirements described above. On the other hand, a public key cryptographic schemes
1
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employ two different keys, which are referred to as public key and private key. A
public key is mathematically related to a private key and is bound to a unique user
by a trusted third party. The public key can be published, while the private key is
kept secretly. The user’s identity can be detected by his/her public key. Therefore,
public key cryptography is a solution to identify the relationship between a received
message and a sender.
Digital signatures which apply the public key cryptography play an important
role in modern cryptography. They primarily provide properties of data integrity
and authenticity. The notion was proposed by Diffie and Hellman [DH76] in 1976.
A digital signature is a receipt of a received message, which means a valid digital
signature can prove the genuineness of the relationship between a message and a
sender. A user cannot deny a valid signature which is generated by his/her private
key. Furthermore, anyone who does not hold the private key cannot forge a valid
message-signature pair with a non-negligible advantage in polynomial time. Digital
signatures are usually used as digital fingerprints in commerce and government. For
example, an online auction can employ digital signature schemes to avoid malicious
participants. Sending a digital signature along with a bidding, a bidder cannot deny
his/her operation. Since the digital signature is unforgeable, smart cards apply
digital signatures to provide access control and identification. E-voting, as another
example, employs a special kind of digital signature to protect the validity of a
ticket, while the voter’s identity is hidden.
With different security requirements desired in practice, numerous types of digital signature schemes have been proposed to achieve additional goals. For example,
to hide a signer’s identity in digital signatures, Rivest, Shamir, and Tauman [RST01]
introduced a notion of ring signature. That is, a signer’s identity is anonymous to
receivers. Moreover, the notion of undeniable signatures was put forth by Chaum
and Antwerpen [CA89] in 1989. The main feature is that the validity of a signature
is only verifiable by a designated verifier, meanwhile, a signer has ability of proving
a given signature is a forgery. In this thesis, we will study a special type of digital
signature and describe two signature schemes which have been proved to be secure.

1.1

Public Key Infrastructure

In a public key cryptosystem, to prove that a public key is genuine and authentic,
and has not been tampered with or replaced by a malicious third party is the central
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problem. Usually certificates are employed to ensure the authenticity of a public key.
A public key certificate issued by a certificate authority (CA) is used for public key
authentication. Practically, the implementation of certificates needs the support of
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), which defines a set of people, policies, hardware,
software and procedures needed to create, store, manage, distribute and revoke
public key certificates [TS10, Sta06].
Although the PKI facilitates key cryptosystems, the computational overhead
encountered in practice is undesired. Certificate management that includes revocation, storage, distribution and the cost of certificate verification is considered
as a problem of the PKI [ARP03, Gut02]. The problem is even more serious in
restricted bandwidth communication environments [DGSW02]. Typically, the certificate management process is not considered in signature schemes. A sender who
signs a message needs to distribute his/her public key certificate to a receiver along
with a message-signature pair. On the other hand, a receiver first checks the certificate to determine the validity of the public key. It is possible to verify a PKI-based
digital signature only if the public key is valid. The cost for certificate management
cannot be ignored.
Ring signatures [RST01] are signer-ambiguous signatures. A signer chooses a
set of ring members including himself and signs a message, however, anyone who
receives the signature cannot distinguish from the actual signer in a given set. In
traditional PKI-based ring signatures [RST01, RST06], the certificate management
problem impacts the efficiency of a system. Both a sender and a receiver have to
certify identities of ring members and corresponding public keys. However, ring
members are not predefined, which implies a signer needs to transport all members’
certificates to a verifier. Considering an extreme example such as e-voting [ALSY07],
if there are one million ring members, a large amount of cost is expended to certificate
transport and verification has to be consumed. Obviously, it is not practical in the
real world, thus, ring signature schemes are not suitable for large scale applications.

1.2

Challenging Issues and Related Work

A solution to the certificate management problem in signatures is identity-based
signatures (IBS), which was put forth by Shamir [Sha85]. Identity-based signature
schemes [CC03, Wat05] employ user identities as their pubic keys. Since a private
key has been mathematically bound to a unique identity during the key generation
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phase by a trusted third party, there is no need to use certificates in public key
authentications. The trusted third party is referred to as a Private Key Generator
(PKG). In a signature verification process, a verifier can directly use a user’s identity
as the public key to check a signature without certifying the validity of the key.
Obviously, the certificate management problem has been eliminated by using the
notion of identity-based signatures. Unfortunately, a new problem called key escrow
problem becomes an inherent problem, where a third party who is dishonest can
abuse users’ private keys.
Green and Hohenberger [GH07] proposed a solution using a blind key extraction
in 2007. They described a protocol that a PKG has no secret information about
a user after a private key is obtained by a user. In 2009, Yuen, Susilo, and Mu
[YSM10] presented a construction of identity-based signature scheme without the
key escrow problem. The proposed scheme is escrow-free and a malicious PKG can
be detected if it impersonates any user. Different from traditional IBS, a user needs
two private pieces of information, namely the identity-based secret key and the user
secret key, to sign a message. A PKG that only has the identity-based secret key
does not have the ability of generating a valid signature. However, the size of such
signature is questionable. Applying threshold signatures can alleviate the key escrow
problem [YCK04], but the key can be exposed by collusion.
A certificate is a proof of the relationship of a public key and an identity. Typically, the public key infrastructure is employed to distribute and manage certificates.
It is a mature but complex system. The certificateless public key cryptography (CLPKC) is proposed by Al-Riyami and Paterson [ARP03] in 2003. It aims to avoid the
use of certificate in data encryption and digital signature schemes. Like identitybased signatures, there is a trusted third party called Key Generation Center (KGC)
who generates partial private keys for users. A private key is computed by a partial private key and a secret value chosen by the user. Hence, the KGC cannot
compromise a user’s private key since the secret value is unknown to it. Moreover,
user’s identities are certified during the partial private key generation process and
the validity of the key can be implicitly checked in a signature verification process.
In certificateless public key cryptography, a user key generation process is divided into four parts: Partial-Private-Key-Extract, Set-Secret-Value, Set-Private-Key
and Set-public key [ARP03]. Obtaining a partial private key from a KGC, a user can
pick a secret value and generate a pair of private and public keys. Certificateless
signature schemes [ARP03, HWZD07, ZZ08] are normally based on costly pairing
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computation, the computational efficiency of a scheme has to be considered. An
efficient certificateless signature scheme was proposed by Choi, Park, Hwang and
Lee [CPHL07] in 2007. The scheme requires only one paring operation and it is
provably secure in the random oracle model. Yap, Chow, Heng, and Goi [YCHG07]
introduced a security mediated certificateless signature scheme without pairing operations. However, the signing algorithm in the proposed scheme needs the help of
an online security mediator (SEM) who is a semi-trusted server. Users are required
to communicate with a SEM during the signature generation.
Certificateless public keys are implicitly certified in a signature verification algorithm. However, a verifier cannot believe a public key without a certificate. Once
a verification algorithm outputs false, a user does not know if a public key or a
signature is invalid. Therefore, certificateless public key signature schemes have to
consider an attacker who has the ability of replacing a user’s public key.
In Eurocrypt 2003, Gentry [Gen03] put forth the notion of certificate-based encryption (CBE) to solve the certificate management problem in traditional PKI.
Similar to certificateless public key cryptography, the CBE does not have an explicit
certificate to prove a user public key. Later, the idea was extended to certificatebased signatures (CBS) [KPH04, LHM+ 07]. Although it is not necessary to employ
the CBS to resolve the certificate management problem [Gen03], the CBS has advantages over the identity-based signatures and certificateless signatures.
A trusted third party in CBS is referred to as certificate authority (CA) who
is different from the PKG and KGC. To generate a certificate-based signature, a
user has to hold secrets, namely a user private key sk and a valid certificate of
the corresponding public key. Due to the fact that the private key sk is unknown
to the CA, the third party cannot impersonate a user. In addition, a certificate
transmission does not need a secure channel which is necessary in both identitybased signatures and certificateless signatures.
Certificate-based signatures [KPH04, LHM+ 07] are similar to certificateless signatures. But a partial private key in CL-PKC is replaced by a certificate issued
by a CA. In certificate-based signatures, a certificate captures all features of public
key certificates in the traditional public key infrastructure. It can also be individually published and verifiable. Wu, Mu, Susilo, and Huang [WMSH08, WMSH09]
described a generic construction that converts a certificateless signature scheme to
a certificate-based signature scheme. Moreover, they presented security levels of
certificate-based signature schemes. An efficient certificate-based signature scheme
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without pairings was proposed by Liu, Baek, Susilo, and Zhou in 2008 [LBSZ08].
The scheme applied a technique called non-interactive proof-of-knowledge [CS97] to
prove the validity of a presented public key. Unfortunately, the size of users’ public
keys and signatures have to be increased, it might not be suitable for some limited
bandwidth applications.
The efficiency of signature schemes is important in some applications. Smart
card, as an example, requires a fast signing process since the computing power of a
card is restricted. In Crypto 1989, Even, Golreich, and Micali [EGM90] firstly introduced a notion of online/offline digital signatures. Their motivation is to improve
the speed of signature generation procedure. In such schemes, a signing process is
divided into two phases, namely the offline phase and the online phase. Most of
heavy computations are pre-computed in the offline phase where the powerful computing environment is provided. The online phase issues a very fast algorithm to
sign messages using stored results of offline phase. Golreich, and Micali [EGM90]
proposed the first generic construction to convert any signature into an online/offline
signature scheme. However, the large size of signatures is a drawback.
In 2001, Shamir and Tauman [ST01] presented an efficient construction for converting signature schemes into online/offline signature schemes. Using the notion
of trapdoor hash functions [KR00], they introduced a new method called hash-signswitch. In the proposed construction, the online signing algorithm is efficient and
the size of online/offline signatures is only twice as the size of original signatures.
Moreover, the security of the original signature scheme is also enhanced.
A notion of batch verification was put forth by Fiat [Fia90, Fia97] to save the
cost of signature verifications. The aim is to verify a batch of signatures from single
or multiple signers at one time. It is useful in centralized applications and repetitive
tasks. For example, a bank server can check all transactions simultaneously in
the midnight. Ballare, Garay, and Rabin [BGR98] described three techniques of
batch verification, which are random subset test, small exponents test, and bucket
test. Generally, small exponents test is fast but not suitable for a large number of
signatures. Instead, bucket test receives a better result in this case. However, Boyd
and Pavlovski [BP00] found general attacks for batch verification schemes [YL95,
Har98]. Fortunately, a repair of these attacks is also provided. Actually, many
signature schemes [BLS04b, PS06, Wat05] provide the property of batch verification
and schemes based on bilinear parings with batch verification were also proposed
[GMC08, FGHP09, CHP07, GZ09].
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The notion of ring signatures was introduced by Rivest, Shamir, and Tauman
[RST01] in Asiacrypt 2001. It was developed from a related notion of group signatures proposed by Chaum and Heyst [CvH91] in 1991. In group signatures schemes,
a trusted group manager predefines a group of users and distributes keys to group
members. Any user in the group can sign a message on behalf of the group and
the signer anonymity is provided. However, the group manager who can revoke
the anonymity of group members has the ability to distinguish the signer of a message. Ring signature schemes are simplified group signature schemes that there is
no group manage required and users can decide a group themselves. The notion
of ring signatures inherits the main feature of group signatures which is the signer
anonymity. Moreover, as a group of users are temporarily defined by a user, ring
signature schemes provide perfect anonymity that anyone cannot distinguish who
is the actual signer from a presented group. A method applied to construct ring
signature schemes for RSA-type keys and DL-keys was proposed by Abe, Ohkubo,
and Suzuki [AOS02].
A limitation of traditional PKI-based ring signature schemes [RST01, XZF04,
SW07, SS10] is the overhead of message signing and signature verification. Because n users participate in group, both signer and verifier have to authenticate
the validity of ring members. In other words, the certificate management problem in PKI becomes serious. Hence, some solutions using identity-based signatures, certificateless signatures and certificate-based signatures have been proposed
[ZK02, ALYW06, CY07, ZZW07a, ALSY07].
Typically, the size of a ring signature depends on the size of the group. It
is undesired in some low bandwidth environment. A constant-size ring signature
scheme was presented by Au, Liu, Susilo, and Yuen [ALSY06] in 2006. Additionally,
the proposed scheme provides a new property called Revoke-iff-Linkability. That is,
if a user signs twice, his identity can be detected and revoked by anyone. In some
applications, such as ad hoc and e-cash, the size of traditional ring signatures may
need to count identities, public keys and certificates of users. The reason is that a
sender cannot ensure in an unstable environment a receiver has all related certificates
of ring members.

1.3. Self-Certified Public Keys
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Self-Certified Public Keys

The notion of self-certified public keys was introduced few years after the identitybased signatures was proposed. Girault [Gir91], in Eurocrypt 1991, introduced this
idea to bridge a gap between the traditional PKI-based signatures and identitybased signatures. As certificateless signatures and certificate-based signatures, the
self-certified signature is also a means of solving certificate management and key
escrow problems mentioned above. All three types of signatures achieve the same
goal, while in different ways.
In self-certified signatures, a trusted third party (TTP) is employed to generate
an entity which is referred to a witness for every user. Unlike normal digital signatures, a user’s public key is not explicitly given in self-certified signatures. Instead, it
is implicitly computed and certified in a signature verification. Nevertheless, a user
who holds a witness can also explicitly extract a public key. Thus the cost for public
key computation can be saved after a successful certification. Once a signature is
accepted by a receiver, he/she can believe that the issued witness is valid. Then
receiver applies a key recovery algorithm to find a signer’s public key and explicitly
use it to verify a signature without public key verification operation.
Girault [Gir91] proposed the first signature scheme using self-certified public
keys. A witness issued by a TTP is a RSA signature of a user’s identity and a
related public key. Anyone who has the witness, user’s identity and TTP’s public
parameters can compute a user’s public key. Girault described three security levels
of self-certified public keys [Gir91].
• Level-1: A TTP knows the users’ private keys and it has the capability to
impersonate any user without being detected.
• Level-2: A TTP does not have users’ private keys, however, it is still able to
forge a witness and impersonate any user without being detected.
• Level-3: A TTP does not know users’ private keys and it can be detected if a
TTP uses false witness to impersonate any user.
Girault argued that the proposed scheme achieves the highest security level
(level-3). However, Saeednia [Sae03] found that, for this scheme, it is possible for
dishonest TTP to specially choose RSA modulus which is easy to solve the corresponding discrete logarithm problem in order to compromise users public keys.
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A provably secure RSA-based self-certified signature scheme was introduced by
Zhou, Cao, and Lu [ZCL04] in 2004. The idea is that a RSA modulus is chosen by
a user itself. Although the proposed scheme is secure in the random oracle model,
the signature verification process has to be divided into two steps. It is due to the
different RSA moduli chosen by a user and a TTP.
Self-certified public keys based on discrete logarithm is proposed by Petersen and
Horster [PH97] in 1997. Based on the idea of weak blind Schnorr signatures [HMP95],
they presented a protocol to distribute users’ witnesses. A TTP who generates users’
witnesses does not have any knowledge about users private keys. Moreover, a selfcertified public key can be hierarchically verified and some applications are given
in the paper. However, there is no security proofs for proposed schemes which are
claimed secure.

1.4

Aims and Contributions

This thesis focuses on self-certified digital signatures and their formal security proofs.
Firstly, our proposed solutions aim at avoiding certificate management problem, key
escrow problem, and preventing malicious TTP, as well as capturing all features of
self-certified signature schemes. It is reasonable that self-certified public keys are
deserving to use in multi-user environments. Secondly, our work intends to boost
the speed of self-certified signatures in both signing and verification processes. We
consider our main contributions in two aspects.
In digital signatures, the online/offline signature [EGM90] is adopted to speed up
the signature generation process and the batch verification [Fia90, Fia97] improves
the efficiency of signature verifications. Our proposed efficient self-certified signature
scheme naturally enjoys both of these features. Providing pre-computation, the cost
of signing for a given message can be largely reduced. In some scenarios, it is required
to verify a batch of signatures at one time. The scheme affords efficient batch
verifications for both single-signer and multi-signer settings. Moreover, the batch
verification in multi-signer setting requires constant pairing calculations defined in
Section 2.1.3 regardless of the number of different signers. In addition, we give
two methods of verifying a self-certified signature using a witness or a recovered
public key respectively. The scheme also inherits advantages of original self-certified
signatures. Thus, our scheme is suitable for limited computation power and low
bandwidth applications.
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We introduce a novel notion of self-certified ring signature schemes. The proposed scheme does not require any certificates to check the validity of ring members’
public keys. As a composite element, a witness is applied as a public key, which
is implicitly verified in the signature verification. Meanwhile, a witness can be
used as a traditional public key certificate that a user’s public key can be explicitly
extracted from a valid witness. Hence, the certificate management in traditional
ring signature schemes is removed. Although identity-based ring signature schemes
[LW04, HS04, Her07] have lower cost since user’s identity is a public key, the key
escrow is a potential security problem. Our scheme is provably secure in the random
oracle model.

1.5

Overview of the Thesis

The rest of the thesis is organized as follows.
Chapter 2 provides some background of cryptography, which include cryptographic hash functions, bilinear maps, mathematical complexity problems, definitions of several different digital signature schemes. The forking lemma and random
oracle model are also introduced as two tools for security proofs in this thesis.
In Chapter 3, an efficient self-certified signature with batch verification is proposed. We present a formal definition of self-certified signature schemes and their
security model. Relationships among the proposed scheme, online/offline signatures
and batch verification are presented. A formal security proof in the random oracle
is also provided.
In Chapter 4, a novel notion of self-certified ring signatures is introduced. We
extend it to combine the conception of self-certified public keys and ring signatures.
A formal definition of self-certified ring signature schemes and their security requirements are elaborately proposed. Furthermore, we prove that the proposed scheme
is secure in the random oracle model.
Finally, we conclude the thesis in Chapter 5.

Chapter 2
Background
Cryptography background and some mathematical definitions are given in this chapter. Provided notions are the underlying knowledge through the thesis.

2.1

Preliminaries

2.1.1

Cryptographic Hash Functions

Cryptographic hash functions [RS04] are widely used in modern cryptography. An
important application of hash functions is to verify the data integrity, such as the
message authentication code (MAC). Hence, most of digital signature schemes apply
hash functions to prove the message integrity.
Definition 2.1 A hash function is a deterministic function that takes as input an
arbitrary length bit string, outputs a fixed length bit string which is called a hash
value. We denote a hash function H as a mapping
H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n ,
where n is the length of a hash value.
A typical paradigm in digital signature schemes is so-called hash-and-sign that requires hash functions have the following properties:
• Pre-image resistance: Given a hash value h, it is computationally infeasible
to find an input m such that H(m) = h.
• Collision resistance: Basically, the collision is to find two different inputs
that output the same hash value. Two types of collision resistance are defined
as follows:
11
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– Strong collision resistance: It is computationally infeasible to find a pair of
input string (m, m0 ), where m 6= m0 , such that H(m) = H(m0 ) [Dam87,
BR97].
– Weak collision resistance: Given an input string m, it is computationally
infeasible to find another input string m0 , where m 6= m0 , such that
H(m) = H(m0 ) [NY89].
• Computational efficiency: Given an input string m, the hash value H(m)
can be found efficiently.
Definition 2.2 A cryptographic hash function is a hash function that provides above
properties.
Practically, the length of hash values is different among cryptographic hash functions. The output length is normally decided by the security requirement. Generally
speaking, a desired cryptographic hash function should have a sufficient large output
size. For example, Rivest’s well-known hash function MD5 [Riv92] with a 128-bit
hash value has been broken. Some other broadly used cryptographic hash functions
are proposed in [ZPS92, KR00, AdM04]. In the rest of the thesis, we consider the
length of hash values as 160 bits.

2.1.2

Random Oracle Model

In 1993, Bellare and Rogaway [BR93] introduced the random oracle model into
security proofs. They refer an ideal cryptographic hash function as a random oracle
that outputs uniform hash values. Once the random oracle model is applied as a
technique for security proof, hash functions in the scheme can be replaced by such
random oracles (functions). In other words, an adversary has to query hash values
due to the random function is unknown to him/her. A party, called the challenger
in the model, handles random oracles to simulate corresponding outputs for any
queries. Since the assumption that output hash values are truly random does not
hold in realistic, a scheme which is secure in random oracle model may be insecure
in practice [CPS08].

2.1. Preliminaries

2.1.3

13

Bilinear Maps

Bilinear maps (pairings) based cryptography is a hot topic in the last decade. Generally, a bilinear map is a function that maps two vector space elements to another
vector space element. Two important bilinear parings used in cryptography are Weil
pairing [BF01] and Tate pairing [FMR99, BLS04a]. The early application of bilinear
parings was to attack elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) in 1993 [MOV93]. Later on,
this tool has been used to design cryptographic protocols. Numerous pairing-based
encryption and signature schemes are proposed (e.g, [BB04, BLS04a]). We briefly
review the definition of bilinear maps as follows:
Definition 2.3 Let G and GT be two multiplicative cyclic groups of same large
prime order p. g is a generator of G. The map e : G × G → GT is a bilinear
mapping (pairing) and (g, p, G, GT , e) is a symmetric bilinear group. Some properties
of bilinear pairing are as follows:
• Bilinearity: For all u, v ∈ G and for all a, b ∈ Z∗p , we have the equation
e(ua , v b ) = e(u, v)ab .
• Non-Degeneracy: For all g ∈ G, if g is a generator of G, we have e(g, g) 6= 1
is a generator of GT .
• Efficiency: There is an efficient algorithm to calculate e(u, v) for all u, v ∈ G.

2.1.4

Forking Lemma

Pointcheval and Stern [PS96] firstly introduced the concept of forking lemma into
the security proof for digital signature schemes. The idea is to use the oracle replay
attack that outputs two different valid signatures within the same random tape
and different random oracles to solve some underlying hard problems of the scheme.
Being proved by Pointcheval and Stern [PS96], the forking lemma is a useful method
of proving security of digital signature schemes. Unfortunately, it is restricted in the
random oracle model. A precondition of using forking lemma is that two different
hash functions can be used in a scheme. In fact, hash functions are usually fixed
in signature schemes. Hence, the requirement can only be satisfied with the help of
random oracles. A generalized version of forking lemma was presented by Bellare
and Neven [BN06] in 2006. We review the definition of forking lemma in signatures
as follows:

2.2. Complexity Problems
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Definition 2.4 Let A be an adversary (probabilistic polynomial time turning machine), given public parameters as input, if A has non-negligible probability to find
a tuple (m, r, σ, h), where σ is a valid signature of a message m and h is the oracle
output of a random tape r, then A has non-negligible probability to find another valid
tuple (m, r, σ 0 , h0 ) with the same random tape r and different random oracles such
that h 6= h0 .

Figure 2.1: Forking Answers to Random Oracle Queries

2.2

Complexity Problems

The security of modern cryptography is based on some underlying mathematical
problems which are computationally hard in polynomial time. In computational
complexity theory, if there is no deterministic Turing machine that can solve a
problem in polynomial time with the error probability bounded by δ ∈ [0, 21 ), we say
that the problem is a non-deterministic polynomial time (N P ) problem or simply
called hard problem [Mao04]. On the other hand, we say that a problem is a P
problem if there exists a Turing machine that can solve the problem in polynomial
time. Most modern cryptographic schemes rely on the widely believed N P problems,
even there is no proof that we cannot find a deterministic Turing machine to solve
the problem. For example, the large integer factorization and discrete logarithm
problems are two basic N P problems and many variants have been developed. In
this section, we introduce some hard problems that will be used in the following
chapters. For more hard problems and their utilizations in cryptography, please
refer to [DBS04].
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Discrete Logarithm Problem

The discrete logarithm problem is a basic and widely used hard problem in cryptosystems [McC90]. In abstract algebra, the discrete logarithm is an analogue of
ordinary logarithm in the group theory over the real or complex numbers. Let G be
a cyclic multiplicative group and g ∈ G is a generator of group G. We say that the
solution a, such that let the equation b = g a hold, is a discrete logarithm to the base
g of b in the group G and denote a = logg (b). An efficient algorithm [PH78] to solve
√
the discrete logarithm problem requires the complexity as O( q), where q = |G|.
However, it is not sufficiently efficient in practice. The discrete logarithm problem
can be described as:
Definition 2.5 Let G be a multiplicative cyclic group of order p. g is a generator
of group G. Zp is a finite field. Given g a ∈ G, the discrete logarithm (DL) problem
on G is to compute a ∈ Zp .
The DL problem is (t, )-hard, if there is no probabilistic polynomial time (PPT)
algorithm A can solve the DL problem in time at most t with advantage  if
DL AdvA = Pr[a ← A(g, g a ) : a ∈R Zp ] ≥ .

2.2.2

Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem

In 1976, Diffie and Hellman firstly proposed a new mathematical problem called
Diffie-Hellman (DH) problem [DH76]. The problem is said to be hard as the computational complexity of Diffie-Hellman problem is close to the discrete logarithm problem. That means the DL problem can be solved in polynomial time if there exists an
algorithm can solve the DH problem in polynomial time. Typically, some reductions
are given from the DL problem to the DH problem [Mau94, BL96]. The variations
of Diffie-Hellman problem and their hardness are presented in [BDZ03]. Usually, the
Diffie-Hellman problem refers to the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem.
The CDH problem is one of well-known hard problems in cryptography.
Definition 2.6 Let G be a multiplicative cyclic group of order p. g is a generator
of group G. Given two values g a , g b ∈ G, where a, b are unknown integers that
0 < a, b < p, the computational Diffie-Hellman problem on G is to compute g ab .
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The CDH problem is (t, )-hard, if there is no PPT algorithm A that can solve
the CDH problem in time at most t with advantage  if
CDH AdvA = Pr[g ab ← A(g, g a , g b ) : a, b ∈R Zp ] ≥ .

2.2.3

Weak Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem

Mitsunari, Sakai and Kasahara proposed a new hard problem called k-weak Computational Diffie-Hellman (k-wCDH) problem in 2002 [MSK02]. The problem is hard
if and only if there is no probabilistic polynomial time algorithm can solve the hard
problem Collusion Attack Algorithm with k traitors (k-CAA) [MSK02]. We give the
definitions for the k-CAA and k-wCDH problems as follows:
Definition 2.7 Let G be a multiplicative cyclic group of order p. g is a generator
of group G. Zp is a finite field. Given an instance
1

1

< g, g a , h1 , . . . , hk ∈ Zp , g h1 +a , . . . , g hk +a >,
where k is an integer and a ∈R Zp , the collusion attack algorithm with k traitors on
1

G is to compute g h+a for some h ∈
/ {h1 , . . . , hk }.
The k-CAA problem is (t, )-hard, if there is no PPT algorithm A that can solve
the k-CAA problem in time at most t with advantage  if
" 1
#
1
1
g h+a ← A(g, g a , h1 , . . . , hk , g h1 +a , . . . , g hk +a ) :
CAA Advk,A = Pr
≥ .
a ∈R Zp , hi ∈ Zp , h 6= hi , i ∈ {1, . . . , k}
Definition 2.8 Let G be a multiplicative cyclic group of order p. g is a generator
2

k

of group G. Zp is a finite field. Given k + 1 values < g, g a , g a , . . . , g a >, where k
is an integer and a ∈R Zp , the k-weak computational Diffie-Hellman problem is to
1

compute g a .
The k-wCDH problem is (t, )-hard, if there is no PPT algorithm A that can
solve the k-wCDH problem in time at most t with advantage  if
1

k

wCDH Advk,A = Pr[g a ← A(g, g a , . . . , g a ) : a ∈R Zp ] ≥ .
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k+1 Exponent Problem

The k + 1 exponent problem (k+1EP) was introduced by Zhang, Safavi-Naini and
Susilo [ZSNS04] in 2004. The hardness of k + 1 exponent problem is proved that
it is polynomial time equal to the k-wCDHP. However, we should notice that both
k+1EP and k-wCDH problem are no harder than the CDH problem.
Definition 2.9 Let G be a multiplicative cyclic group of order p, g is a generator
2

k

of group G. Zp is a finite field. Given k + 1 values < g, g a , g a , . . . , g a >, where k
k+1

is an integer and a ∈R Zp , the k+1 exponent problem is to compute g a

.

The k+1EP is (t, )-hard, if there is no PPT algorithm A can solve the k+1EP
in time at most t with advantage  if
k+1

EP Advk,A = Pr[g a

2.3

k

← A(g, g a , . . . , g a ) : a ∈R Zp ] ≥ .

Digital Signatures

The notion of digital signatures was envisioned by Diffie and Hellman [DH76] in
1976. In public key cryptography, the signer holds his/her private key that can
generate a signature of a message by a one-way trapdoor function. Any receiver can
verify the correctness of a signature via the signer’s public key. A digital signature is
used to be a proof of the authorship of a message. Hence, digital signatures should
satisfy some requirements [RSA78]: 1) A valid signature can prove that the message
has been signed by the signer; 2) Only the signer can generate a valid signature by
his/her private key; 3) The signer cannot deny a valid signature of a message that
signed by his/her private key; 4) A valid signature implies that the message has not
been modified.
Definition 2.10 A digital signature scheme consists of three algorithms: KeyGen,
Sign and Verify.
• KeyGen: A PPT algorithm run by a user that takes as input a security parameter k, outputs a pair of private and public keys (sk, pk), where
(sk, pk) ← KeyGen(k).
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• Sign: A PPT algorithm run by a user that takes as input a message m and a
private key sk, outputs a signature σ, where
σ ← Sign(m, sk).
• Verify: A deterministic algorithm that takes as input a message m, a signature
σ and the signer’s public key pk, outputs true if the signature is valid, otherwise
outputs false.
{true, f alse} ← Verify(m, σ, pk).

2.3.1

Security Notion

Unforgeability is the underlying security notion of digital signatures. That is, an
adversary is computationally infeasible to find a valid message-signature pair without
the signer’s private key. Once the pair passes the signature verification algorithm
Verify and the pair is not an output of an authorized signer, we say that is a valid
forgery. Basically, there are four security levels of digital signatures [GMR88].
• Existential forgery: The adversary has a probability to find a valid forgery for
a message.
• Selective forgery: The adversary can find a valid forgery for the chosen message.
• Universal forgery: The adversary can find a valid forgery for any message without the knowledge of the private key.
• Total break: The adversary can recover the signer’s private key.
In the security proof of digital signature schemes, we usually consider the strongest
security notion existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen-message attacks
(EUF-CMA) [GMR88]. A signature scheme is said to be secure under EUF-CMA if
an attacker who receives valid signatures issued by an oracle for any queried message
(where the message may be a special choice based on the previous message-signature
pair), he/she cannot generate a new valid forgery.

2.4

Ring Signatures

In 2001, Rivest, Shamir, and Tauman put forth the notion of ring signatures. It
simplifies the conception of group signatures [CvH91]. A group of users who are not
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predefined in ring signature schemes can be randomly selected. The identity of a
user who signs a message is hiding in the group. No one can distinguish from an
actual signer in the group. This property is referred to as anonymity.
Definition 2.11 A ring signature scheme consists of three algorithms: KeyGen,
Sign and Verify.
• KeyGen: A PPT algorithm run by a user that takes as input a security parameter k, outputs a pair of private and public keys (sk, pk),
(sk, pk) ← KeyGen(k).
• Sign: A PPT algorithm run by a user that takes as input a message m, a
Sn−1
S
{ID
},
the
corresponding
set
of
public
keys
set of identities n−1
i
i=0,i6=k {pki }
i=0
and the signer’s private key skk , where k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n − 1}, outputs a ring
signature σ, where
σ ← Sign(m,

n−1
[

n−1
[

i=0

i=0,i6=k

{IDi },

{pki }, skk ).

• Verify: A deterministic algorithm run by a user that takes as input a message
S
m, a signature σ, a set of identities n−1
i=0 {IDi } and the corresponding set of
Sn−1
public keys i=0 {pki }, outputs true if the signature is valid, otherwise outputs
false.
{true, f alse} ← Verify(m, σ,

n−1
[

n−1
[

i=0

i=0

{IDi },

{pki }).

However, there is a practical drawback in ring signatures. Prior to message
signing and signature verification, both the signer and the verifier have to hold all
public keys of members in the ring. In traditional public key infrastructure, that
means a user needs to get and certify every member’s public key before the signing
and verification. This is related to the certificate distribution issue. Luckily, some
solutions have been proposed, such as identity-based ring signatures [ZK02], certificateless ring signatures [CWMZ09] and certificate-based ring signatures [ALSY07].
More details will be given in Chapter 4.

2.5. Online/Offline Signatures
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Online/Offline Signatures

Online/Offline signature was firstly introduced by Even, Goldreich and Micali [EGM90]
in 1990. The motivation is to enhance the security of existing digital signatures and
improve the signing efficiency. In online/offline signature schemes, the signing algorithm consists of both offline and online phases. Prior to receiving a message, the
offline part is to sign a random bit string using a basic signature scheme. Once the
message is given, a user issues the message with a small amount of computations.
Hence, online/offline digital signature schemes can be secure under EUF-CMA regardless of the security of the offline part signature scheme. In addition, if a trapdoor
hash function is applied during the online phase, the computational cost can be reduced to one multiplication [ST01]. The overhead in online/offline signatures is
that the offline part outputs have to be securely stored and ensure that every output is one-time used. We review the definition of online/offline signature schemes
introduced by Shamir and Tauman [ST01].
Definition 2.12 An online/offline signature scheme consists of four algorithms:
KeyGen, Signoff , Signon and Verify.
• KeyGen: A PPT algorithm run by a user that takes as input a security parameter k, outputs a pair of private and public keys (sk, pk), a pair of hash and
trapdoor keys (hk, tk),
{(sk, pk), (hk, tk)} ← KeyGen(k).
• Signoff : A PPT algorithm run by a user in the offline phase that takes as input
a random chosen pair (m0 , r0 ), a private key sk and a hash key hk, outputs a
signature σ 0 and a hash value Hhk (m0 , r0 ), where
{σ 0 , Hhk (m0 , r0 )} ← Signoff (m0 , r0 , sk, hk),
the tuple < m0 , r0 , σ 0 , Hhk (m0 , r0 ) > is stored.
• Signon : A PPT algorithm run by a user in the online phase that takes as input
a message m, a tuple < m0 , r0 , σ 0 , Hhk (m0 , r0 ) >, a hash key hk, outputs a
signature σ, where
σ ← Signon (m, m0 , r0 , Hhk (m0 , r0 ), hk).

2.6. Identity-Based Signatures
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• Verify: A deterministic algorithm run by a user that takes as input a message
m, a signature σ, a public key pk and a hash key hk, outputs true if the
signature is valid, otherwise outputs false,
{true, f alse} ← Verify(m, σ, pk, hk).

2.6

Identity-Based Signatures

Shamir introduced the notion of identity-based signatures (IBS) in 1984 [Sha85].
The IBS is a kind of signature that allows a user to verify a signature through the
signer’s unique identity information (e.g., user’s email address), which is referred to
as his/her public key. A trusted third party called Private Key Generator (PKG)
is desired to generate every user’s private key according to his/her identity. Indeed,
the PKG has a master secret key which is unknown to users. A user’s private key
can be seen as a signature of his/her identity information generated by PKG using
the master secret key. Once a user expects to verify an identity-based signature, a
PKG’s master public key is required along with the signer’s identity.
Definition 2.13 An identity-based digital signature scheme consists of four algorithms: Setup, KeyGen, Sign and Verify.
• Setup: A PPT algorithm run by the PKG that takes as input a security parameter k, outputs a pair of master secret and public keys (msk, mpk) and public
system parameters params,
(msk, mpk, params) ← Setup(k).
• KeyGen: A PPT algorithm run by the PKG that takes as input a user identity
ID, params and a master secret key msk, outputs a user private key sk,
sk ← KeyGen(ID, params, msk).
• Sign: A PPT algorithm run by a user that takes as input a message m, params
and a private key sk, outputs an identity-based signature σ, where
σ ← Sign(m, params, sk).

2.7. Certificateless Signatures
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• Verify: A deterministic algorithm run by a user that takes as input a message
m, a signature σ, params, a master public key mpk and the signer’s identity
ID, outputs true if the signature is valid, otherwise outputs false,
{true, f alse} ← Verify(m, σ, params, mpk, ID).
Since a public key is derived from the user’s identify, the public key distribution
infrastructure has been eliminated in IBS. Moreover, certificates are not required
as a user’s public key is implicitly certified during signature verification process.
However, with the knowledge of users’ private keys, a PKG can sign a message on
behalf of any user. It is an inherited problem called key escrow problem in IBS.

2.7

Certificateless Signatures

In traditional PKI-based digital signatures, a certificate is adopted to prove a user’s
identity. However, it is inefficient in practice. Thus, Al-Riyami and Paterson
[ARP03] introduced a conception of certificateless public key cryptography which
does not require a public key certificate. A signer holds two secret pieces of information which are partial private key (PPK) and secret value to generate a signature.
Since a user’s identity has been authenticated in the process of applying a PPK,
verifiers only need to use a presented public key to verify a signature.
Definition 2.14 A certificateless public key digital signature scheme consists of five
algorithms: Setup, Partial-Private-Key-Extract, UserKeyGen, Sign and Verify.
• Setup: A PPT algorithm run by the KGC that takes as input a security parameter k, outputs a master secret/public key pair (msk, mpk) and public system
parameters params,
(msk, mpk, params) ← Setup(k).
• Partial-Private-Key-Extract: A PPT algorithm run by the KGC that takes as
input an entity’s identification ID, params, a master public key mpk and a
master secret key msk, outputs a partial private key ppk,
ppk ← Partial-Private-Key-Extract(ID, params, mpk, msk).
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• UserKeyGen: A PPT algorithm run by a user that takes as input a partial
private key ppk, a user identity ID and params, outputs a pair of private and
public keys (sk, pk),
(sk, pk) ← UserKeyGen(ppk, ID, params).
• Sign: A PPT algorithm run by a user that takes as input a message m, params
and a private key sk, outputs a signature σ, where
σ ← Sign(m, params, sk).
• Verify: A deterministic algorithm run by a user that takes as input a message
m, a signature σ, params, an identity ID and a public key pk, outputs true
if the signature is valid, otherwise outputs false,
{true, f alse} ← Verify(m, σ, params, ID, pk).

2.8

Certificate-Based Signatures

The notion of certificate-based signature (CBS) is extended from CBE [Gen03]. In
CBS, a trusted third party called certificate authority issues certificates for users.
A user who holds a private key and corresponding certificate can sign a message.
In a signature verification process, a user’s public key is implicitly certified without
being checked separated.
Definition 2.15 A certificate-based digital signature scheme consists of five algorithms: Setup, UserKeyGen, CertGen, Sign and Verify.
• Setup: A PPT algorithm run by the CA that takes as input a security parameter
k1 , outputs a master secret key msk, a master public key mpk and public
system parameters params,
(msk, mpk, params) ← Setup(k1 ).
• UserKeyGen: A PPT algorithm run by a user that takes as input a security
parameter k2 and params, outputs a pair of private and public keys (sk, pk),
(sk, pk) ← UserKeyGen(k2 , params).
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• CertGen: A PPT algorithm run by the CA that takes as input a user public key
pk, an identity information ID, params, a master public key and a master
secret key msk, outputs a certificate Cert,
Cert ← CertGen(pk, ID, params, mpk, msk).
• Sign: A PPT algorithm run by a user that takes as input a message m, params,
a certificate Cert and a private key sk, outputs a certificate-based signature σ,
where
σ ← Sign(m, params, Cert, sk).
• Verify: A deterministic algorithm run by a user that takes as input a message
m, a signature σ, an identity ID, params, a master public key mpk and a
user public key pk, outputs true if the signature is valid, otherwise outputs
false,
{true, f alse} ← Verify(m, σ, ID, params, mpk, pk).

2.9

Self-Certified Signatures

In order to avoid certificate management problem and key escrow problem, the
notion of self-certified public keys was introduced by Girault [Gir91]. Similarly, selfcertified signature schemes require a trusted third party. However, a third party has
no ability of obtaining user’s private keys. Briefly, a user randomly chooses a pair
of public and private keys using a set of common parameters published by a trusted
third party. Then, a user sends a public key and proves to a third party that he/she
knows the related private key. If it is valid, a trusted third party issues a witness
which is a signature of a user’s public key and identity. In a self-certified signature
scheme, a witness can be used to extract a user’s public key by anyone. Therefore,
it is unnecessary to use additional certificates and the private key is unknown to a
third party.
Definition 2.16 A self-certified signature consists of five algorithms: Setup, KeyGen, WitReg, Sign and Verify.
• Setup: A PPT algorithm run by the TTP that takes as input a security parameter k1 , outputs a pair of master secret and public keys (msk, mpk) and
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public system parameters params,
(msk, mpk, params) ← Setup(k1 ).
• KeyGen: A PPT algorithm run by a user that takes as input a security parameter k2 and params, outputs a pair of private and public keys (sk, pk),
(sk, pk) ← KeyGen(k2 , params).
• WitReg: A PPT algorithm run by the TTP that takes as input an identity ID,
a public key pk, a proof of knowledge of private key ppk, params and a master
public key, outputs a witness W ,
W ← WitReg(ID, pk, ppk, params, mpk).
• Sign: A PPT algorithm run by a user that takes as input a message m, pubic system parameters params and a private key sk, outputs a self-certified
signature σ, where
σ ← Sign(m, params, sk).
• Verify: A deterministic algorithm run by a user that takes as input a message
m, a signature σ, params, a master public key mpk, an identity ID and a
witness W , outputs true if the signature is valid, otherwise outputs false,
{true, f alse} ← Verify(m, σ, params, mpk, ID, W ).

2.10

Batch Verification

Fiat [Fia90, Fia97] introduced an idea called batch verification to improve the efficiency of a signature verification. Originally, his idea is for the RSA verification.
In a batch verification scheme, a user who simultaneously verifies a batch of signatures accepts all signed messages if the result of verification turns out to be true.
Several techniques for batch verification were described by Ballare, Garay and Rabin [BGR98]. The technique which is referred to as the small exponents test is a
fast probabilistic test. However, a general attack was found by Boyd and Pavlovski
[BP00] in 2000. As mentioned in their solution, to prevent the attack, a test algorithm should satisfy two requirements: 1) The order p of a group G is prime; 2)
Check all chosen elements λi ∈ G, where i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. The repaired definition of
small exponents test in a cyclic group is as follows:
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Definition 2.17 Let G be a multiplicative cyclic group of prime order p. g is a
generator of a group G. Given (x1 , y1 ), (x2 , y2 ), . . . , (xn , yn ), where xi ∈ Zp and
yi ∈ G. l is a security parameter, where l < |Zp |.
1. Check if for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} : yi = g xi .
2. Randomly choose a set {r1 , . . . , rn }, where ri ∈R {0, 1}l , i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
3. Compute x =

Pn

i=1

xi ri mod p, and y =

Qn

i=1

y ri .

4. Accept all signatures if y = g x , otherwise, reject.

Chapter 3
Efficient Self-Certified Signatures with
Batch Verification
This chapter describes a new construction of self-certified signatures. It is efficient
in signing phase with pre-computation. The proposed scheme can be applied to
batch verification.

3.1

Introduction

Digital signature is an important primitive in modern cryptography. A valid digital
signature can be seen as a receipt of a message from the particular sender and can
be applied to many security services such as authentication and non-repudiation.
Signature verification relies on public key or signature verification key; therefore,
proving the relationship between a public key and its owner is essential for security
of signatures. In practice, it relies on the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). That
is, Certificate authority (CA) as a part of PKI issues public key certificates to its
users. Nevertheless, PKI might not be desirable. Often, a signature has to be
distributed along with its public key certificate. Prior to the signature verification,
a signature receiver needs to check the validity of the corresponding certificate and
store the certificate for later communications. Certificate distribution, verification
and storage add additional cost to communication, computation and storage.
The notion of identity-based signature (IBS) was introduced by Shamir in 1984
[Sha85]. Problems of certificate verification and management are solved by using the
signer’s identity as his public key. This idea has been applied to various signature
schemes, including several multi-user signatures (e.g., [ZK02, GR06]). An identitybased signature scheme secure in the standard model was proposed by Paterson and
Schuldt [PS06]. In identity-based signatures, a user’s private key is generated by a
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trusted authority (TA), as a private key generator (PKG). As a drawback of identitybased systems, PKG can sign a message on behalf of any user. It is referred to as
the so-called key escrow problem. The problem may be avoided by sharing master
secret key among several authorized parties [YCK04], but a potential collusion of
the authorities could still be a problem. Some other efforts are also presented in
[YSM10, Cho09].
To fill the gap between the PKI based and identity-based signatures, Girault
[Gir91] introduced the notion of Self-certified Public Keys, where certificate verification and management are not required and the key escrow problem can be eliminated. The idea is that the certificate is replaced by a witness and the public key is
embedded in it. Anyone who holds a witness along with an attributive identity can
recover a correct public key for signature verification. The amount of communication, computation and storage are also reduced. Unlike identity-based schemes, the
trusted third party (TTP) cannot extract user’s private key. The scheme captures
a strong security (level-3) defined by Girault [Gir91]. Notice that IBS only reaches
level-1 security.
Saeednia [Sae03] found a problem in the Girault’s scheme, namely, a malicious
TTP can compromise user private key by using a specific composite modular of RSA.
Roughly speaking, the TTP chooses two “small” prime numbers to compute the RSA
modulus n and it is helpful to solve the discrete logarithm problem. We refer the
readers to [Sae03]. Zhou, Cao and Lu [ZCL04] prevented this attack by utilizing
different user chosen modular, whereas the size of signature is increased and the
public key recovery must be separated from the signature verification. Self-certified
public key generation protocol based on discrete logarithm was also proposed in
[PH97].
In this chapter, we propose an efficient and novel self-certified signature (SCS)
scheme, which achieves the level-3 security as defined by Girault. The scheme is
based on the discrete logarithm rather than RSA. Hence, the private key exposure
problem has been resolved. In our scheme, there is no need to separate a certificate
and a public key. Instead, we embed user’s public key in a witness, which can be
seen as a lightweight certificate. The public key can be implicitly verified in the
signature verification, while anyone who has the user identity and the witness can
explicitly extract the public key. We present both cases in our scheme.
The efficiency of a signature scheme is normally evaluated by two aspects: signing
efficiency and verification efficiency. In the signing phase, our self-certified signature
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scheme only requires one exponent and two multiplication computations with no
pairing calculation. We also show that our SCS scheme can be made more efficient
by utilizing the idea of pre-computation so that only one multiplication computation
is needed. In the verification phase, our scheme requires two pairing computations.
However, it is reduced to one pairing computation when the signer’s public key
has been recovered explicitly. Additionally, we show that our scheme is especially
suitable for verifying large number of signatures by batch verification. The result
shows that our scheme achieves a constant number of pairing computations in multisigner setting. We prove that our scheme is secure in the random oracle model.
Related Work. The notion of certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC)
was introduced by Al-Riyami and Paterson [ARP03] in 2003. The idea is similar to
self-certified public keys, since the signer is implicitly certified in signature verification and no certificate involved the scheme. Similar with TTP in SCS scheme, an
authority called Key Generation Centre (KGC) who generates partial private keys
for users. An efficient certificateless signature scheme was proposed by Choi, Park,
Hwang and Lee [CPHL07] (or CPHL for short). An efficient pairing-free security
mediated certificateless signature scheme was proposed by Yap, Chow, Heng and
Goi [YCHG07]. While the signing algorithm is an interactive protocol between a
signer and an online semi-trusted server. The signature generation needs the help
of a third party. Gentry [Gen03] introduced Certificate-Based Cryptography (CBC)
as another paradigm to remove certificate and solve private key escrow problem.
Indeed, the CL-PKC and CBC schemes can easily transfer from the one to the other
[WMSH09]. Liu, Baek, Susilo and Zhou [LBSZ08] (or LBSZ for short) proposed a
certificate-based signature scheme without pairing computations in random oracle.
The main difference between self-certified signatures and certificateless or certificatebased signatures is the key recoverable property. In self-certified signatures, the
user’s public key is computable by anyone who has his witness along with a set
of public parameters. Once the user’s public key has been recovered, the TTP’s
public key is no longer required. It implies that the cost of key certification and
calculation is only needed at the initial stage of a communication as traditional
signature schemes. If we treat the witness as a “public key”, then it can be used
along with the TTP’s public key to verify a signature. In certificateless signatures
and certificate-based signatures, on the other hand, the signature verification always
needs the KGC’s public key and the user’s public key is uncomputable except the
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Table 3.1: Comparison of Existing Schemes. (P: pairing computation; E: exponentiation; M: multiplication; Size: number of elements; SCS-1: our basic scheme; SCS-2:
public key is already recovered by a verifier.)
Signing
Verification Signature Size Public Key Size
CPHL
2E
1P+2E+1M
2
1
LBSZ
1E+2M
3E+4M
3
3
Our SCS-1 1E+2M 2P+3E+1M
2
1
Our SCS-2 1E+2M
1P+2E
2
1
KGC.
We compare some efficient schemes in CL-PKC, CBC and SCS models in Table
1. Our proposed scheme has two cases in signature verification. The SCS-1 is used
when a user’s public key is unknown and the SCS-2 is carried out in the case of the
public key has been computed. The result shows that the verification cost can be
reduced as in the second case. Both Signature Size and Public Key Size columns
indicate the number of required group elements.
Organization of This Chapter. The rest of this chapter is organized as follows.
The definition of our scheme and complexity assumptions are given in Section 3.2. A
formal security model of our scheme is defined in Section 3.3. Our proposed scheme
along with a formal security proof of our scheme is given in Section 3.4. Further
discussions on pre-computation and batch verification are presented in Section 3.5
and 3.6, respectively. Finally, Section 3.7 concludes the chapter.

3.2

Definitions

Digital signature schemes are basically consisted of three algorithms: key generation
(KeyGen), signing algorithm (Sign) and verification algorithm (Verify). Besides
the basic algorithms, a self-certified signature scheme has two additional algorithms:
the system setup algorithm (Setup) for generating system parameters and the witness registration algorithm (WitReg) for registering a user. The five algorithms in
SCS are defined as follows:
• Setup(k1 ): is a PPT algorithm run by a Trusted Third Party (TTP) that
takes as input a security parameter k1 , outputs the public system parameters
param and a master secret key msk.
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• KeyGen(k2 ): is a PPT algorithm run by a user that takes as input a security
parameter k2 , outputs a pair of public and private keys (pk, sk).
• WitReg(ID, pk, v): is a PPT algorithm run by the TTP that takes as input
a user’s identity ID, public key pk and the proof of the knowledge of private
key v, outputs a witness W if the proof v is valid, otherwise rejects.
• Sign(m, sk): is a PPT algorithm that takes as input a message m, private key
sk, outputs a signatures σ = (u, t).
• Verify(m, σ, ID, W ): is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input a message m, a signature σ, user’s identity ID and the witness W , outputs true if
it is valid, otherwise outputs false.

3.3

Security Models

Goldwasser, Micali and Rivest [GMR88] introduced the strongest security notion of
digital signature schemes: existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen-message
attacks (EUF-CMA). A self-certified signature scheme needs to satisfy EUF-CMA
as normal signature schemes. However, there are some differences according to the
use of self-certified public keys. Girault [Gir91] defined the security of self-certified
public keys as three levels: 1) The TTP knows a user’s private key; 2) The attacker
cannot know a user’s private key, but it can forge a false witness without being
detected by users; 3) Anyone cannot know a user’s private key and cannot forge
a witness without being detected. Hence, the identity-based signature schemes are
only reach the level 1. A self-certified signature scheme should satisfy the level 3.
Following this notion, we define a security model of self-certified signature schemes.
There are two cases in our security model and the SCS scheme is EUF-CMA iff it
is secure in both cases.
• Type I adversary (AI ): plays as a malicious user who does not get a valid
witness from the TTP. The adversary tries to forge a witness that cannot be
detected in the verification phase.
• Type II adversary (AII ): is considered as a corrupted TTP who tries to reveal
the user’s private key.
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The security of self-certified signatures is defined by two games.
Game 1: This is a game defined as Type I attack. The challenger runs Setup and
gives public parameters to AI . AI has an ability to access user private keys, but the
master secret key is unknown. The adversary makes Corruption, WitReg, Sign
queries and outputs a forgery.
• Setup: The challenger C runs the algorithm Setup to generate public parameters param and returns to AI .
• Queries: AI has the ability to adaptively submit three types of query defined
as follows.
– Corruption Query: On AI ’s query ID, C returns the corresponding
private key. AI can make this query at most q1 times.
– WitReg Query: On AI ’s query (ID, pk, v), C runs the algorithm WitReg
and returns a valid witness W . AI can make this query at most q2 times.
– Sign Query: On AI ’s query (m, ID), C runs the algorithm Sign and
returns a signature σ of message m. AI can make this query at most q3
times.
• Forgery: AI outputs a signature σ ∗ = (u∗ , t∗ ) of a message m∗ that the
pair (m∗ , ID∗ ) is not queried in Sign Query and W ∗ is not an output of
WitReg Query. AI wins the game if the Verify(m∗ , σ ∗ , ID∗ , W ∗ ) =true.
The advantage of AI is defined as
AdvAI = Pr[AI wins].
Definition 3.1 A self-certified signature scheme is (t, q1 , q2 , q3 , )-secure against adaptively chosen message Type I attack, if there is no AI who wins Game 1 in polynomial
time t with advantage at least  after q1 , q2 , q3 queries.
Game 2: This is a game defined as Type AII attack. The challenger runs Setup
and gives public parameters to AII . Due to AII is considered as a dishonest TTP,
a master secret key is also returned, but AII has no ability to access user private
key. Then the adversary makes Public-Key, Sign queries and outputs a forgery.
• Setup: The challenger runs the algorithm Setup, outputs public parameters
param and a master secret key msk. C gives param and msk to the adversary.
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• Public-Key Query: On AII ’s query ID, the challenger C runs the algorithm
KeyGen and returns a public key. AII can make this query at most q1 times.
• Sign Query: On AII ’s query (m, ID), C runs the algorithm Sign and returns
a signature σ of a message m. AII can make this query at most q2 times.
• Forgery: AII outputs a signature σ ∗ = (u∗ , t∗ ) of a message m∗ that the
pair (m∗ , ID∗ ) is not queried in Sign Query. AII wins the game if the
Verify(m∗ , σ ∗ , ID∗ , W ∗ )=true. The advantage of AII is defined as
AdvAII = Pr[AII wins].
Definition 3.2 A self-certified signature scheme is (t, q1 , q2 , )-secure against adaptively chosen message Type II attack, if there is no AII who wins Game 2 in polynomial time t with advantage at least  after q1 , q2 queries.

3.4

The Proposed Scheme

In PKI based schemes, a certificate can be seen as a part of a signature when the
two parties initiate a communication. The verification of a certificate is required
prior to the signature verification. For stable partners who communicate frequently,
the cost of certificate transmission and verification are negligible. However, in most
cases, the participants barely know each other personally, and hence, the verification
process becomes essential. We present a novel and efficient self-certified signature
scheme that the cost of computations, transmission and storage are all reduced.

3.4.1

Construction

Setup: Select a pairing e : G × G → GT , where the order of group G and GT are
the same prime p. Let g be a generator of G. The TTP then chooses two collisionresistant cryptographic hash functions that h1 : {0, 1}∗ → G, h2 : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗p .
Randomly select a number α ∈R Z∗p , set msk = α and the master public key
mpk = g α . The public parameters are (G, GT , g, p, e, h1 , h2 , mpk).
KeyGen: Randomly chooses x ∈R Z∗p and computes e(g, g)x . Sets the public and
private keys as (pk, sk) = (e(g, g)x , x).
WitReg: A user interact with a TTP in this algorithm as follows.
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• The user computes a proof of knowledge of private key v = g αx , where x is the
user private key, and sends (ID, pk, v) to TTP.
?

• TTP verifies the equation e(v, g) = pk α , if it holds, then generates a witness
1

1

W = (v α h1 (ID)) α .
• The user accepts the witness if the following equations holds:
e(W, mpk)e(h1 (ID)−1 , g)
1

= e(v α h1 (ID), g)e(h1 (ID)−1 , g)

(3.1)

= pk.
Sign: To sign a message m ∈ {0, 1}∗ , the signer randomly selects r ∈R Z∗p and
computes
1 − rh2 (m||g r )
)
x
= (u, t).

σ = (g r ,

Verify: On input a signature σ = (u, t) on a message m under a witness W of the
identity ID, the verifier checks whether
?

e(W t , mpk)e(uh2 (m||u) h1 (ID)−t , g) = e(g, g)

(3.2)

or
?

e(g, g)xt e(uh2 (m||u) , g) = e(g, g).

(3.3)

Outputs true if the equation holds, otherwise outputs false. The equation (3.3) is
to utilize once the user public key was recovered as in (3.1).
Correctness: Our self-certified signature scheme is correct as shown in following:
e(W t , mpk)e(uh2 (m||u) h1 (ID)−t , g)
1

= e((v α h1 (ID))t , g)e(uh2 (m||u) h1 (ID)−t , g)
= e(g xt g rh2 (m||u) , g)
= e(g, g).
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Security Analysis

A self-certified signature is unforgeable if it is secure against two types of attacks
defined in Section 3.3. We show that our signature scheme is secure under the
strongest security notion for signature schemes (EUF-CMA).
Theorem 3.1 Our SCS scheme is (t, qh1 , q2 , q3 , )-secure against existential forgery
under Type I chosen message attack, qh1 is the number of queries on h1 hash function, assuming that the (k+1)-exponent assumption is (t0 , 0 )-hard, where,
0 ≥

1
1 q2 +1
· (1 −
)
· ,
q2
q2 + 1

t0 = t + O(qh1 + q2 + q3 ).

Suppose a Type I adversary AI who can (t, q1 , q2 , q3 , )-break our SCS

Proof:

scheme. We can construct an algorithm B run by the challenger to use AI to
solve the (k+1)-exponent problem. The algorithm B is given the (k+1)-EP instance
2

3

4

(g, g a , g a , g a ), where k = 3, and the goal is to output g a . B interacts with AI in
game 1 as follows.
Setup: B sets g a as the generator of a group G and the master public key mpk = g.
Let the master secret key msk = a−1 , which is unknown to B. B maintains four
lists Lh1 = {< ID, b, coin ∈ {0, 1} >}, Lh2 = {< M, c >}, Lc = {< ID, sk >} and
Lw = {< ID, pk, v, W >}, which are initially empty.
h1 Query: AI issues an h1 query on input IDi at most qh1 times, where 1 ≤ i ≤ qh1 .
B outputs h1 (IDi ) if IDi is in the list Lh1 . Otherwise, B tosses a coin with the
probability Pr[coin = 1] = ξ (Pr[coin = 0] = 1 − ξ), selects bi ∈R Z∗p and answers
the query as follows.

abi


 coini = 0 : h1 (IDi ) = g ,


 coin = 1 : h (ID ) = g a3 bi ,
i
1
i
B outputs h1 (IDi ) and adds < IDi , bi , coini > in the list Lh1
h2 Query: AI issues an h2 query on input string Mi at most qh2 times, where
1 ≤ i ≤ qh2 . B outputs h2 (Mi ) if Mi is in the list Lh2 . Otherwise, B randomly
selects ci ∈R Z∗p and sets h2 (Mi ) = ci . Then, B outputs h2 (Mi ) and adds < Mi , ci >
into the list Lh2 .
Corruption Query: AI issues a corruption query on input identity IDi , where
1 ≤ i ≤ q1 . B outputs ski if IDi is in the list Lc . Otherwise, B outputs a random
choice ski ∈R Z∗p and adds < IDi , ski > in the list Lc .
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WitReg Query: AI issues a witness query on input (IDi , pki , vi ), where 1 ≤ i ≤ q2 .
B outputs a witness Wi if IDi is in the list Lw . Otherwise, B retrieves the private
key ski and bi in Lc and Lh1 , respectively. If coini = 0, B sets and outputs witness
Wi as
2 (sk

Wi = g a

i +bi )

.

B adds < IDi , pki , vi , Wi > into the list Lw . If coini = 1, B outputs FAIL and aborts
the simulation.
Sign Query: AI issues a signing query on input (mi , IDi ), where 1 ≤ i ≤ q3 . B
retrieves the private key ski from the list Lc . If it exists, runs the algorithm Sign
and outputs a signature σ on message mi . Otherwise, B runs Corruption Query
first, then generates a signature as before.
Forgery: Eventually, AI outputs a forgery σ ∗ = (u∗ , t∗ ) on message m∗ under
the witness W ∗ of identity ID∗ . AI wins the game if Verify(m∗ , σ ∗ , ID∗ , W ∗ )
outputs true, the pair (m∗ , ID∗ ) does not be an input of Sign Query and W ∗ is
not an output of WitReg Query. We assume that sk ∗ and b∗ are in Lc and Lh1 ,
respectively. B computes a solution of (k+1)-exponent problem (k = 3) as follows
2 sk ∗

4

g a = (W ∗ g −a

1

) b∗ .

Probability: The simulator B outputs FAIL only if coini = 1 when the adversary
queries a witness. Hence, the challenger can solve the (k + 1)-exponent problem
in condition of the simulation is success and the forgery witness is related to the
index i. The probability is 0 ≥

1
q2

· (1 −

1
)q2 +1
q2 +1

·  and the reduction process is as

[BLS04b]. The time of an exponentiation in each query is denoted as O(1), so the
simulation time is t0 = t + O(qh1 + q2 + q3 ).



Theorem 3.2 Our SCS scheme is (t, q1 , q2 , )-secure against existential forgery under Type II chosen message attack, assuming that the DL assumption is (t0 , 0 )-hard,
where
0 = ,

t0 ≥ t + O(qh1 + q1 + 2q2 ).

Proof: Suppose a Type II adversary AII who can (t, q1 , q2 , )-break our SCS scheme.
We can construct an algorithm B run by the challenger to use AII to solve the DL
problem. The algorithm B is given the DL instance (g, g a ), and the goal is to output
a. B interacts with AII in game 2 as follows.
Setup: B sets g as the generator of a group G and the master public key mpk = g α .
Let the master secrete key msk = α and give it to AII . B maintains three list
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Lh1 = {< ID, b >}, Lh2 = {< M, c >} and Lpk = {< ID, pk, s >}, which are
initially empty.
h1 Query: AII issues an h1 query on input IDi at most qh1 times, where 1 ≤ i ≤ qh1 .
B outputs h1 (IDi ) if IDi is in the list Lh1 . Otherwise, B randomly chooses bi ∈ Z∗p
and sets h1 (IDi ) = g bi . Then, B outputs h1 (IDi ) and adds < IDi , bi > in the list
Lh1 .
h2 Query: AII issues an h2 query on input string Mi at most qh2 times, where
1 ≤ i ≤ qh2 . B answers the query as h2 Query in game 1 and adds < Mi , ci > in
the list Lh2 .
Public-key Query: AII issues a public-key query on input IDi , where 1 ≤ i ≤ q1 .
B outputs pki if IDi is in the list Lpk . Otherwise, B randomly chooses si ∈R Z∗p and
computes public key
pki = e(g a , g)si .
B then outputs pki and adds < IDi , pki , si > into the list Lpk .
Sign Query: AII issues a signing query on input (mi , IDi ), where 1 ≤ i ≤ q2 . B
answers queries as follows:
• If IDi is not in Lpk , B runs Public-Key Query.
• Otherwise, B randomly selects ci , ri ∈R Z∗p and computes
1

ui = g ci (g a )−si ri ,

ti = ci ri .

Let Mi = mi ||ui and h2 (Mi ) = ci , B adds < Mi , ci > into the list Lh2 and
outputs the signature σi = (ui , ti ).
Forgery: Eventually, AII outputs a forgery σ ∗ = (u∗ , t∗ ) on message m∗ under
a witness W ∗ of the identity ID∗ . AII wins the game if Verify(m∗ , σ ∗ , ID∗ , W ∗ )
outputs true and the pair (m∗ , ID∗ ) is never queried to the Sign Query. Then, B
can run the same random tape and a different h2 to output another valid signature
σ ∗0 = (u∗0 , t∗0 ). The outputs of two h2 hash functions are respectively c∗ and c∗0 ,
where c∗ 6= c∗0 . We assume that s∗ is in the list Lpk . B can compute


 1 − r∗ c∗ = as∗ t∗ ,

r∗ (c∗0 − c∗ )
,
a= ∗ ∗

s (t − t∗0 )

 1 − r∗ c∗0 = as∗ t∗0 ,
as a solution of DL problem.
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Probability: The simulator B does not outputs FAIL in any queries. The challenger
can solve the DL problem in condition of the successful simulation. Hence, the
probability is 0 = . The time consuming of an exponentiation is considered as
O(1). Therefore, the simulation time is t0 = t + O(qh1 + q1 + 2q2 ).

3.5



Self-Certified Signatures with Precomputations

Even, Goldreich and Micali introduced the notion of online/offline signatures [EGM90]
to improve the signature generation efficiency. Their main idea is to split the signature generation into two stages, namely offline stage and online stage. Most heavy
computations are carried out in the offline stage prior to the availability of the message. Once the message is received, the algorithm can output a signature quickly by
conducting the online stage. They proposed a method which converts any signature
schemes into an online/offline signature scheme. However, it is impractical. Subsequently, Shamir and Tauman presented an efficient “hash-sign-switch” paradigm
[ST01]. The signature size is largely reduced while the efficiency is maintained.
Our scheme provides pre-computation in the signing stage as some other schemes
mentioned in [ST01]. It is easy to partition our scheme into two parts: offline stage
and online stage. In the offline stage, the signer picks a random choice r0 , where
0

r0 ∈R Z∗p . Then he/she computes u0 = g r and t0 =

r0
.
x

The pair (u0 , t0 ) should be

securely stored. In the online stage, the signer retrieves a pair (u0 , t0 ), and computes
u = u0 , t = x−1 − t0 h2 (m||u0 ) as a signature on the message m. Hence, in the online
signature operations, it only requires a modular multiplication and a subtraction,
provided that the signer stores the inverse of his private key x−1 . In addition, the
length of our self-certified signature scheme is as short as [ST01].

3.6

Batch Verification

The notion of batch verification was introduced by Fiat in 1989 [Fia90]. Generally,
the motivation of batch verification is to improve the verification efficiency when
verifying large number of signatures. According to the three paradigms of batch
verification scheme proposed in [BGR98], we apply the Small Exponent Test in this
chapter. The length l of the exponent is a security parameter that depends on the
security requirement in practice. Batch verification for single-signer and multi-signer

3.6. Batch Verification

39

settings are both provided in this section.

3.6.1

Single-Signer Batch Verification

In the single-signer setting, there is no need to implicitly verify signer public keys
in all signatures, since all public keys are the same. Therefore, we assume that the
signer’s public key has been recovered and the equation (3) is used in the verification.
Nevertheless, the equation (2) can be used in a similar way if the public key is not
computed.
Let (G, GT , g, p, e, h1 , h2 , mpk) be public parameters and k = |G| = |GT |. Given
a set of signatures S = {σ1 , σ2 , . . . , σn }, where σi = (ui , ti ), on messages M =
{m1 , m2 , . . . , mn } from the same singer in which pk = e(g, g)x . The verifier checks
S as follows.
• If ui ∈
/ G, where i = 1, 2, . . . , n, rejects all signatures and outputs false.
• Otherwise, randomly selects l-bits elements (λ1 , λ2 , . . . , λn ) ∈ Znp , where l < k,
and computes:
T = λ1 t1 + λ2 t2 + . . . + λn tn =

n
X

λi ti ,

i=1
λ h2 (m1 ||u1 )

U = u1 1

λ h2 (m2 ||u2 )

· u2 2

λ h2 (mi ||ui )

. . . ui i

=

n
Y

λ h2 (mi ||ui )

ui i

,

i=1

C = λ1 + λ2 + . . . + λi =

n
X

λi .

i=1

Accepts all signatures and outputs true if the equation holds
e(g, g)xT e(U, g) = e(g, g)C .
Correctness
e(g, g)xT e(U, g)
Pn

Pn

= e(g, g)x i=1 λi ti e(g, g) i=1 ri λi h2 (mi ||ui )
n
n
Y
Y
λi −ri λi h2 (mi ||ui )
= e( g
, g)e( g ri λi h2 (mi ||ui ) , g)
i=1

i=1

= e(g, g)C .
Let A be a modular addition in Z∗p and P a is a pairing calculation. M uls is a modular multiplication in group s. An l-bits exponentiation in group s is denoted as
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Exs (l) and a test of a group member is Gt. Computational cost of has functions
in both types of verification are ignored since they are the same. The cost of native verification and batch verification on n signatures in single-signer setting are
respectively,
nExG (k) + nExGT (k) + nP a + nM ulGT
and
nGt+2nM ulZ∗p +2(n−1)A+nExG (k)+1ExGT (k)+1P a+1ExGT (l)+(n−1)M ulG +1M ulGT .
Theorem 3.3 The batch verification of our self-certified signature scheme in singlesigner setting is secure, if there is no adversary with probability at least 2−l , where
l is the length of a small exponent.
Proof:

Suppose that an adversary outputs a forgery (M ∗ , S ∗ ) accepted by batch

verification under identity ID. We show that the probability of a valid forgery
depends on the length l of a small exponent.
Without losing generality, we assume that the public key pk = e(g, g)x has been
recovered from (1). A signature σi∗ = (u∗i , t∗i ) can be considered as
σi∗ = (g ri ,

1 − ri h2 (m∗i ||g ri ) + ki
),
x

where ri , ki ∈R Z∗p . If ki = 0, the signature is valid. Otherwise, it is invalid. Then,
we can compute that
∗

T =

λ1 t∗1

+

λ2 t∗2

+ ... +

λn t∗n

=

n
X

λi t∗i ,

U ∗ = U,

C ∗ = C.

i=1

If the following equation holds
∗

e(g, g)xT e(U ∗ , g)
Pn

Pn

∗

∗

= e(g x , g) i=1 λi ti e(g, g) i=1 ri λi h2 (mi ||ui )
n
n
Y
Y
∗
λi −ri λi h2 (m∗i ||ui )+λi ki
= e( g
, g)e( g ri λi h2 (mi ||ui ) , g)
i=1

i=1
C∗

= e(g, g) ,
then

Pn

i=1

λi ki ≡ 0 (mod p). Assuming that at least one signature σj∗ is invalid. It

implies the adversary can find a kj such that
λj ≡

−kj−1

n
X
i=1,i6=j

λi ki

(mod p), kj 6= 0.
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However, small exponents λi , where i = 1, 2, . . . , n, are l-bits random choices selected
by the verifier. Hence, the probability of an adversary break the batch verification
is equal to the probability of the equation hold, where
"
n
n
X
X
−1
Pr λj ≡ −kj
λi ki ≡ 0
λi ki (mod p)

#
(mod p) ≤ 2−l .

i=1

i=1,i6=j



3.6.2

Multi-Signer Batch Verification

Generally speaking, the batch verification in a single-signer setting is a special case
of that in a multi-signer setting. The amount of pairing computations normally
depend on the number of signers in the multi-signer batch verification. However, we
show that our scheme only needs constant pairing computations.
Suppose that public keys have not been recovered in this case. Let (G, GT , g, p, e,
h1 , h2 , mpk) be public parameters and k = |G| = |GT |. Given a set of signatures
S = {σ1 , σ2 , . . . , σn }, where σi = (ui , ti ), on messages M = {m1 , m2 , . . . , mn } with
witnesses W T = {W1 , W2 , . . . , Wn } under identity I = {ID1 , ID2 . . . , IDn }, respectively. The verifier checks S as follows.
• If ui ∈
/ G, where i = 1, 2, . . . , n, rejects all signatures and outputs false.
• Otherwise, randomly selects l-bits elements (λ1 , λ2 , . . . , λn ) ∈ Znp , where l < k,
and computes:
T = W1λ1 t1 · W2λ2 t2 . . . Wnλn tn =

n
Y

Wiλi ti ,

i=1

U=

h (m ||u )
(u1 2 1 1 h1 (ID1 )−t1 )λ1

h (m2 ||u2 )

· (u2 2

h1 (ID2 )−t2 )λ2

h (m ||u )

. . . (ui 2 i i h1 (IDi )−ti )λi
n
Y
h (m ||u )
=
(ui 2 i i h1 (IDi )−ti )λi ,
i=1

C = λ1 + λ2 + . . . + λi =

n
X

λi .

i=1

Accepts all signatures and outputs true if the equation holds
e(T, mpk)e(U, g) = e(g, g)C .
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Correctness
e(T, mpk)e(U, g)
Pn

= e(g xi h(IDi ), g)

i=1

λi ti

n
Y
h (m ||u )
e( (ui 2 i i h1 (IDi )−ti )λi , g)
i=1

Pn

Pn

= e(g, g)
e(g, g) i=1 ri λi h2 (mi ||ui )
n
n
Y
Y
λi −ri λi h2 (mi ||ui )
= e( g
, g)e( g ri λi h2 (mi ||ui ) , g)
i=1 xi λi ti

i=1

i=1
C

= e(g, g) .
The cost of the original verification and the batch verification on n signatures in a
multi-signer setting are respectively,
3nExG (k) + nM ulG + 2nP a + nM ulGT
and
nGt+nM ulZ∗p +3nExG (k)+(3n−2)M ulG +nExG (l)+(n−1)A+2P a+1M ulGT +1ExGT (l).
Theorem 3.4 The batch verification of our self-certified signature scheme in multisigner setting is secure, if there is no adversary with probability at least 2−l , where
l is the length of a small exponent.
Proof:

Suppose that an adversary outputs a forgery (M ∗ , S ∗ ) accepted by batch

verification under a set of identities I ∗ with their corresponding witnesses W T ∗ .
We show that the probability of a valid forgery depends on the length l of a small
exponent.
Different from single-signer setting, we assume that users public keys have not
been recovered. Let xi , where i = 1, . . . , n, be the ith user private key. A signature
σi∗ = (u∗i , t∗i ) can be considered as
σi∗ = (g ri ,

1 − ri h2 (m∗i ||g ri ) + ki
),
xi

where ri , ki ∈R Z∗p . If ki = 0, the signature is valid. Otherwise, it is invalid. Then,
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we can compute that
λ t∗
W2 2 2

∗

λ t∗
W1 1 1

∗

∗
h (m ||u )
(u1 2 1 1 h1 (ID1 )−t1 )λ1

T =

·

∗
. . . Wnλn tn

=

n
Y

λi t∗i

Wi

,

i=1

U =

h (m2 ||u2 )

· (u2 2

∗

h1 (ID2 )−t2 )λ2

∗

h (m ||u )

. . . (ui 2 i i h1 (IDi )−ti )λi
n
Y
∗
h (m ||u )
=
(ui 2 i i h1 (IDi )−ti )λi ,
i=1
∗

C = λ1 + λ2 + . . . + λi =

n
X

λi .

i=1

If the following equation holds
∗

e(T ∗ , mpk)e(U ∗ , g) = e(g, g)C ,
then

Pn

i=1

λi ki ≡ 0 (mod p). Assuming that at least one signature σj∗ is invalid. It

implies the adversary can find a kj such that
λj ≡

−kj−1

n
X

λi ki

(mod p), kj 6= 0.

i=1,i6=j

However, small exponents λi , where i = 1, 2, . . . , n, are randomly picked by a user
in a batch verification process. Therefore, the probability of an adversary break the
batch verification is equal to the probability of the equation hold, where
"
#
n
n
X
X
−1
Pr λj ≡ −kj
λi ki (mod p)
λi ki ≡ 0 (mod p) ≤ 2−l .
i=1,i6=j

i=1



3.7

Conclusion

In this chapter, we proposed an efficient and novel self-certified signature scheme.
With pre-computation, our scheme requires only one modular multiplication for
signature generation. Our scheme allows the batch verification in both single-singer
and multi-signer settings. We showed that in the multi-signer setting, the verification
of n signatures requires only two pairing computations regardless of the size of n.
Our self-certified signature scheme was proven secure in the random oracle model.

Chapter 4
Self-Certified Ring Signatures
This chapter describes a novel notion of self-certified ring signatures along with its
precise definition, security model and formal security proofs.

4.1

Introduction

The notion of ring signature was first proposed by Rivest, Shamir, and Tauman in
2001 [RST01]. Ring signatures are group-oriented digital signatures, which achieve
signer anonymity as a major feature. It differs to a group signature as there is no
anonymity revocation provided and no group setup stage. Ring signatures allow the
user to sign on behalf of a group which is not predefined. Hence, any user can freely
choose a set of users that include himself as a group and generate a ring signature.
Verifiers believe that someone in the group signed the message, but cannot know
who is the actual signer.
In the traditional public key infrastructure, a signer’s public key is certified
with a signature of the certificate authority. Although the public key certificates
can be used to authenticate user public keys, they increase the computation and
communication cost, especially for a large group. This issue has been a concern
for the application of ring signatures (e.g., [ALSY07, CYH05]). Furthermore, the
complexity of certificates management is also a drawback.
Shamir [Sha85] introduced the notion of identity-based signature (IBS) in 1984.
The idea of the IBS is to eliminate the certificate verification and management problems by using the signer’s identity as the public key. This idea was later applied to
ring signatures (e.g., [ZK02, CLHY05, ALYW06]). The identity-based ring signatures (IBRS) exhibit a better applicability. Unfortunately, the main disadvantage
of IBS and IBRS are user private keys are known by the trusted authority (TA)
who generates the private keys for users. Therefore, TA can impersonate any user
44
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to generate his/her signatures. This problem is referred to as private key escrow.
Girault [Gir91] introduced the concept of self-certified public keys as a solution
to certificate management and private key escrow. The main feature of self-certified
model (SCM) is that the user public key is computable through the witness and
the public key of the trusted third party (TTP). As the public key is compressed
into the witness, there is no need to verify the user’s public key. Hence, compared
with PKI, the self-certified model presents advantages about the amount of storage,
communication and computation. SCM captures the level-3 security defined by
Girault as the private key escrow problem is also eliminated, while a normal IBS
only reaches the level-1.
However, Saeednia [Sae03] found a problem in the Girault’s algorithm in that the
TTP could still compromise the user private key via the selected composite modular
of RSA (a product of two special primes that helps to solve discrete log problem).
A potential solution given in [Sae03] is to increase the size of primes, but the size of
witness will also be increased. Although it is not a problem in [ZCL04], the public
key recovery must be separated from the signature verification and an additional
computation is necessary. There exist some other work in self-certified system (e.g.,
[PH97, Sae97]).
In this chapter, we propose the first self-certified ring signature (SCRS) scheme,
which reaches the level-3 security and fixes a problem in the original SCM. Our
scheme captures all the features of self-certified model and ring signature schemes.
Intuitively, in our scheme, the user’s public key is embedded in a witness. The
user only has to provide the identity and the witness. The verifier can compute the
public key during the signature verification. We present the precise definition of
self-certified ring signatures. We also present a concrete scheme where the ring is
formed with the three-move model introduced in [AOS02].
Our scheme achieves the level-3 security defined by Girault [Gir91]. We provide
a security model of self-certified ring signatures and prove that our SCRS is secure
under this model. Different from the Girault’s algorithm, our scheme does not rely
on the RSA assumption. Therefore, the private key leakage problem is eliminated.
Related Work. Different but similar approach to the self-certificate cryptography
is certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC), which was introduced by AlRiyami and Paterson [ARP03] in 2003. It can also eliminate the key escrow and
certificate management problems. In CL-PKC, the user gets a certificate from the
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Secure
Free
Channel∗
SCRS
Yes
No
CLRS
Yes
Yes
CBRS
Yes
No
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Public Key
Recovery
Yes
No
No

Components of
Private key
1
2
2

Table 4.1: Properties of Existing Paradigms. (*A secure channel is required during
the certificate/PPK transmission.)
key generation center (KGC). It is seen as a partial private key (PPK). Then, the
actual private key is composed of the PPK and a secret value chosen by the user.
The user then generates the public key and it can be verified without a certificate.
In 2007, the notion of ring signatures was applied to CL-PKC by Zhang, Zhang
and Wu [ZZW07b]. Independently, another certificateless ring signature scheme is
proposed in [CY07].
Another related paradigm called certificate-based cryptography (CBC) [Gen03]
was introduced to solve the same problems in PKI and IBS. In CBC, the private
key and the corresponding public key are decided before getting a certificate. But,
the same as in CL-PKC, the certificate is used to sign. CBC is very similar to
CL-PKC and Wu et al. [WMSH09] presented a generic construction to convert
a certificateless signature to a certificate-based signature. CBC is also applied to
ring signatures. Au et al. [ALSY07] proposed the first certificate-based (linkable)
ring signature. We compare some features of certificateless ring signature (CLRS),
certificate-based ring signature (CBRS) and SCRS in Table 1. We can find their
similarities and differences.
Organization of This Chapter. The rest of this chapter is organized as follows.
In Section 4.2, we give the definitions of self-certified ring signature schemes, the
security model, and some mathematical definitions. The concrete scheme was presented in Section 4.3. The security analysis of our scheme is given in Section 4.4.
Finally, we conclude the chapter in Section 4.5.

4.2

Definitions

We give a definition of self-certified ring signatures. As introduced in [Gir91], our
SCRS scheme has a special registration phase where each user gets a witness form
the TTP. The SCRS security model is also given in this section.
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Self-Certified Ring Signature

A self-certified ring signature is composed of the five algorithms: SysSetup, KeyGen, WitReg, Sign and Verify.
• SysSetup(λ1 ): Taking as input a security parameter λ1 , the algorithm returns
public parameters Params and a master secret key msk.
• KeyGen(λ2 ): Taking as input a security parameter λ2 , the algorithm returns
the public and private keys (P K, SK).
• WitReg(ID, P K, Q): Taking as input the identity ID, public key P K and
the proof of knowledge of private key Q, the algorithm returns the witness W
if the Q is valid, otherwise rejects.
Sn−1
S
• Sign(m, n−1
i=0,i6=k {Wi }, SKk ): Taking as input a set of identities
i=0 {IDi },
Sn−1
Sn−1
i=0,i6=k {Wi }, a private key SKk , k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n−
i=0 {IDi }, a set of witnesses
1} and the message m, the algorithm outputs a self-certified ring signature σ.
Sn−1

Sn−1

{Wi }): Taking as input a signature σ, the mesSn−1
{IDi } with the corresponding witnesses
sage m and a set of identities i=0
Sn−1
i=0 {Wi }, the algorithm returns true if it is valid, otherwise returns false.

• Verify(m, σ,

4.2.2

i=0 {IDi },

i=0

SCRS Unforgeability

According to [Gir91], the security of a self-certified signature scheme is defined as
three levels: 1) the TTP knows the user’s private key; 2) the attacker cannot know
user’s private key, but it can forge a false witness without being detected by users;
3) anyone cannot know the user’s private key and cannot generate a false witness
without being detected. Level 3 is the highest security level of self-certified scheme.
We expand this notion and define a security model of self-certified ring signature
schemes. In this model, the self-certified ring signature scheme must be existentially
unforgeable against adaptive chosen-message attacks in two cases. For each type, a
game is given to describe the related attack.
• T ype I attack: The T ype I attacker is an illegal user who does not get
a valid witness from the TTP. The attacker tries to forge a witness that
cannot be detected in the self-certified ring signature verification phase. Let
T ype I attacker be AI for short.
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• T ype II attack: The T ype II attacker represents a dishonest TTP who tries
to compromise the user’s private key in the witness registration phase. Let
T ype IIattacker be AII for short.
Game 1: In this game, we let the adversary be an uncertified user (T ype I attacker)
who tries to forge a valid self-certified ring signature with a forged witness.
Setup: The challenger C runs SysSetup to generate public parameters Params and
the master secret key. Then, C gives Params to the adversary.
Queries: AI can adaptively issue the Wit-Query and Signature-Query queries
to C. These queries are answered as follows:
• Wit-Query: The adversary makes a witness query on (ID, P K, Q), C responds a valid witness by running WitReg algorithm. Let qw be the number
of witness queries in this phase.
• Signature-Query: AI can query the signature for its choice (m,

Sn−1
i=0

{IDi }).

C generates witnesses and returns a signature σ on the message m. Let qs be
the number of signature queries in this phase.
Forgery: AI outputs a message m∗ , a signature σ ∗ , a set of identities and a set
S
∗
of witnesses such that (m∗ , n−1
i=0 {IDi }) is not used in queries and the forged witness
S
∗
W ∗ is not generated by C. The adversary wins the game if Verify(m∗ , σ ∗ , n−1
i=0 {IDi },
Sn−1
∗
i=0 {Wi }) returns true. We denote the advantage of AI as:


S
∗
{ID
},
V erif y(m∗ , σ ∗ , n−1
i
i=0

 Sn−1

 i=0 {Wi∗ }) = true :


R


− KeyGen(λ);

 (P Ki , si ) ←


.
AdvAI = Pr 
W
←
W
itReg(ID
,
P
K
,
Q
);
i
i
i
i



 ∗

 W 6= Wi f or i ∈ {1 . . . , qw };



 m∗ 6= m , f or i ∈ {1 . . . , q };
i
s


S
S
∗
∗
∗
∗
(m , σ ) ← AI ( {ID }, {W });
Definition 4.1 We say that a self-certified ring signature scheme is (t, qw , qs , )secure against Type I attack if there is no Type I attacker who wins Game 1 in
t-time with advantage at least  after qw , qs queries.
Game 2: In this game, we let the adversary be a malicious TTP (T ype II attacker)
who tries to forge a self-certified ring signature using the chosen identity and the
corresponding witness.
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Setup: The challenger runs SysSetup to generate public parameters Params and
master secret key msk. C gives Params and msk to the adversary.
Queries: AII can adaptively issue the Public-key-Query and Signature-Query
queries to C. These queries are answered as follows:
• Public-key-Query: AII makes a public key query on IDi . C generates
(P Ki , SKi ) and returns P Ki . Let qp be the number of public key queries
in this phase.
• Signature-Query: AII makes a signature query on (m,

Sn−1

i=0 {IDi },

Sn−1
i=0

{Wi }).

C responds a valid signature σ by running Sign algorithm. Let qs be the number of signature queries in this phase.
Sn−1
{IDi∗ },
Forgery: AII forges a self-certified ring signature and wins if Verify(m∗ , σ ∗ , i=0
Sn−1
Sn−1
Sn−1
∗
∗
∗
∗
i=0 {Wi }) does not appear in
i=0 {Wi }) returns true where (m , i=0 {IDi },
Signature-Query. We denote the advantage of this adversary as:


Sn−1
∗
∗
∗
V erif y(m , σ , i=0 {IDi },

 Sn−1
∗


{W
})
=
true
:

 i=0
i



 Wi ← W itReg(IDi , P Ki , Qi );
.

AdvAII = Pr  ∗


 W 6= Wi f or i ∈ {1 . . . , qw };


 (m∗ , σ ∗ ) ← AII (ID, Sn−1 {Wi }); 
i=0


m∗ 6= mi , f or i ∈ {1 . . . , qs };

Definition 4.2 We say that a self-certified ring signature scheme is (t, qp , qs , )secure against Type II attack if there is no Type II attacker who wins Game 2 in
t-time with advantage at least  after qp , qs queries.

4.2.3

SCRS Anonymity

Anonymity is the main feature of ring signatures. It requires that the adversary
cannot tell which member in the group generates the signature in polynomial-time
with the probability greater than

1
,
n

where n is the number of ring members. We

define a stronger security model of anonymity of self-certified ring signatures and a
powerful adversary Ap . The adversary holds all members’ private keys while he/she
makes a decision. The game is constructed as follows:
Game 3: In the game, we let Ap be an adversary who tries to guess the actual
singer of a given signature with all users’ keys and witnesses.
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Setup: The challenger runs the SysSetup algorithm to generate public parameters
Params and a master secret key x. C gives Params to the adversary.
S
Sn−1
Sn−1
Query: Ap makes a signature query of its choice ( n−1
i=0 {IDi },
i=0 {Wi },
i=0 {SKi }).
C chooses a signer and runs the Sign algorithm to generate and return a signature
σ. Let qs be the number of signature queries in this phase.
Guess: Ap guesses the actual singer of a given signature and wins if Ap has successfully found the index of the singer in the set of identities. We denote the advantage
of this adversary as:


Sn−1
Sn−1
(m, i=0
IDi , i=0
Wi ,
Aguess
p
 Sn−1
 i=0 SKi ) = j :

 j ∈ {0, ...n − 1};


R
Pr 
− KeyGen(λ);
 (SKi , P Ki ) ←

 Wi ← W itReg(IDi , P Ki , Qi );

Sn−1
R0

 σ ←− Sign(m, i=0 IDi ,
Sn−1
Sn−1
i=0 SKi );
i=0 Wi ,

AdvAp =







 1
−
 n ,






where elements in all sets are indexed as 0, . . . , n − 1 and j is the index of the singer
R0

in the set. We define ←− as “randomly select” a user to be the signer.
Definition 4.3 We say that a self-certified signature scheme is (t, qs , )-anonymous
if there is no adversary who wins Game 3 in t-time with advantage at least  after
qs queries.

4.3

The Proposed Scheme

In this section, we present our self-certified ring signature scheme. Like CLRS and
CBRS, it contains an interactive phase where the user requests a witness from the
TTP. Since the certificate (witness) is used as a PPK in CLRS, the interaction
must be protected by a secure channel that increases the cost and potential security
problems. Otherwise, any one gets a certificate can generate a valid signature.
Although the CBRS is no need to protect the certificate transmission, it still uses
the certificate as a part of private key. In most CLRS and CBRS schemes, the
user must keep these two elements. However, the witness in our scheme is a public
parameter. The signing algorithm only requires the private key to be chosen by user.
Normally, the length of private key in SCRS is half of that in CLRS and CBRS. In
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addition, the signature and witness can be generated in parallel. It is useful in some
potential applications. While the public key in our scheme is implicitly calculated
in the verification, it can be explicitly recovered from the witness and the TTP’s
public key.

4.3.1

Construction

SysSetup: The TTP chooses a symmetric bilinear group defined in Section 2.1.3
(g, q, G, GT , e) and two collision-resistant hash functions H1 : {0, 1}∗ → G, H2 :
{0, 1}∗ → Z∗q . It also randomly selects x, y ∈R Z∗q and sets msk = (x, y), public
y

keys (U, V ) = (g x , g x ). Finally, the TTP gives a set of the public parameters
Params= (e, G, GT , g, q, U, V ).
KeyGen: The user randomly chooses a private key s ∈R Z∗q and let SK = s. It
computes the corresponding public key P K = e(g, g)s .
WitReg: Let (P K, SK) = (e(g, g)s , s) be the user’s public and private keys and do
as follows:
• The user computes the Q = V s and then sends (ID, P K, Q) to the TTP.
1

• The TTP first verifies the user’s Q. If the equation e(Q, U y ) = P K holds, the
TTP generates a witness as:
1

1

W = H1 (ID) x Q y .
• Upon receiving the witness, the user checks if the following equation holds. If
so, the user accepts and publishes the witness; otherwise, rejects it. Remark
that the user only publishes his/her identity and the witness.
e(W, U )e(H1 (ID), g)−1
1

1

1

s

= e(H1 (ID) x Q y , U )e(H1 (ID), g)−1
= e(H1 (ID) x V y , U )e(H1 (ID), g)−1
1

s

= e(H1 (ID) x , g x )e(g x , g x )e(H1 (ID), g)−1
= e(H1 (ID), g)e(g s , g)e(H1 (ID), g)−1
= e(g s , g)
= P K.
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Sign: Let the signer be the kth of the selected set of users. The user Takes as
S
Sn−1
input a message m ∈ {0, 1}∗ , n−1
i=0 {IDi },
i=0,i6=k {Wi } and sk , the user generates
the self-certified ring signature as follows:
• Randomly chooses a number α ∈R Z∗q to compute, ck+1 = H2 (L||m||e(g, g)α ),
where L is the list of selected IDs (include the signer), such that L = ID0 ||ID1
|| . . . ||IDn−1 .
• Randomly selects ri ∈R Z∗q , for i = k + 1, k + 2, . . . , n − 1, 0, . . . , k − 1, then
compute each ci+1 by
ci+1 = H2 (L||m||e(g ri H1 (IDi )−ci , g)e(Wici , U )).
• To form a ring, the user uses the private key (sk ) and calculates,
rk = α − sk ck

(mod q).

The signature of m is σ = (c0 , r0 , r1 , . . . , rn−1 ).
Verify: Taking as input (m, σ,

Sn−1
i=0

{IDi },

Sn−1
i=0

{Wi }), the user computes ci+1 as

above, for i = 0, 1, . . . , n − 1. Accept the signature if c0 = cn , otherwise reject it.

4.3.2

Correctness

Our self-certified ring signature scheme is correct as the following equation holds:
ck+1 = H2 (L||m||e(g rk H1 (IDk )−ck , g)e(Wick , U ))
1

1

= H2 (L||m||e(g rk H1 (IDk )ck , g)e(H1 (IDk ) x Q y , g x )ck )
= H2 (L||m||e(g α−sk ck , g)e(g sk ck , g)
= H2 (L||m||e(g, g)α ).

4.4

Security Analysis

The security of self-certified ring signatures contains two parts, the unforgeability
and the anonymity. Different from certificateless and certificate-based ring signatures, the public key replacement attack in [HSMZ05] and [LHM+ 07] is no longer
valid in self-certified signatures. Our scheme is secure if there is no adversary who
wins any of the following games.
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Game 1 Security

Theorem 4.1 Our self-certified ring signature scheme is (t, q1 , qw , qs , )-secure against
Type I attack if the k+1EP is (t0 , 0 )-hard, where
0 ≥ (1 − p)qw +qs p, t0 ≤ t + (q1 + (3n − 1)qs + 3qw )tpa + 2(n − 1)qs texp .
Here, q1 is number of queries on H1 hash function, texp is the running time of
one exponentiation on a group and tpa is the running time of one bilinear paring
operation.
Proof: Suppose there exists a T ype I attacker who can (t, qw , qs , )-break our SCR
signature scheme. We construct an algorithm B run by the challenger to solve the
1

2

k+1 exponent problem. The algorithm B receives the instance (g a , g, g a , g a ) of k+1
3

exponent problem (k = 3) and aims to output g a using the algorithm AI . Science
1

P is a generator of a group G1 with a prime order, we let g 0 = g a , then it is exactly
an instance of k+1EP. The interaction between B and an adversary AI is as follows.
1

Setup: In Game 1, B sets the public key U = g a and V = g ya , where y ∈R Z∗q .
Then it gives Params to AI and the master secret key

1
a

is unknown to B. B creates

and maintains four lists LH1 = {((ID, con ∈ {0, 1}), u)}, LH2 = {(L, m, θ, R)},
LW1 = {(ID, P K, Q, W )} and LW2 = {(ID, SK, W )}, which are initially empty.
H1 Query: AI can query the result of H1 on IDi at most q1 times, where 1 ≤ i ≤
q1 . If the queried IDi is in the list LH1 , H1 (IDi ) will be returned as the answer.
Otherwise, B chooses ui ∈R Z∗q and responds as follows:
• Tosses a coin with the probability such that:
Pr[con = 1] = p, Pr[con = 0] = 1 − p
and sets the result as coni .

u


 coni = 0 : H1 (IDi ) = gi ,


 con = 1 : H (ID ) = g ui a2 .
i
1
i
• Outputs H1 (IDi ) as the answer and adds ((IDi , coni ), ui ) into the list LH1 .
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H2 Query: AI can query the result of H2 on input (Lj , mj , θj ) at most q2 times,
where θj ∈ G2 and 1 ≤ j ≤ q2 . If (Lj , mj , θj ) is in the list LH2 , Rj will be returned as
the answer. Otherwise, B randomly chooses Rj ∈R Z∗q and sets H2 (Lj ||mj ||θj ) = Rj .
Then B responds with Rj and adds (Lj , mj , θj , Rj ) into the list LH2 .
Queries:
• Wit-Query: Let (P Ki , SKi ) be the AI ’s selected public and private keys
where P Ki = e(g, g)si and SKi = si . AI can query a witness on (IDi , P Ki , Qi )
at most qw times. If Qi is valid, B responds the query and maintains the list
LW1 as follows:
– If IDi is not in LH1 , B runs H1 Query.
– If con = 1, B aborts the simulation and returns FAIL.
– If IDi is already in the list LW1 ∪ LW2 , B returns Wi and P Ki cannot be
replaced.
– Otherwise, B computes and returns a witness as
1

Wi = (V ui Qi ) y ,
and adds (IDi , P Ki , Qi , Wi ) into the list LW1 .
• Signature-Query: AI queries a signature on (mj ,

Sn−1
i=0

{IDi }) at most qs

times and 1 ≤ j ≤ qs . B responds the query and maintains the list LW2 as
follows:
– If IDi is not in the list LW1 ∪ LW2 , where i ∈ {0, n − 1}. B runs H1
Query.
– If coni = 0, sets SKi = si , Wi = V

ui +si
y

, si ∈R Z∗q and adds (IDk , SKk , Wk )

to the list LW2 .
S
– If ∀ID ∈ n−1
i=0 {IDi }, con = 1, B aborts the simulation and returns
FAIL.
– Chooses an index k ∈R {0, . . . , n − 1}\{i : coni = 1}.
– If IDk is in the list LW2 , B responds the as in Sign algorithm.
– Otherwise, selects α ∈R Z∗q , and computes
ck+1 = H2 (Lj ||mj ||e(g, g)α ),
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where Lj = ID0 ||ID1 || . . . ||IDn−1 . If ck+1 is in the list LH2 , B repeats
this step.
– Selects ri ∈R Z∗q and computes
ci+1 = H2 (Lj ||mj ||e(g ri H1 (IDi )−ci , g)e(Wici , U )),
where i = k + 1, . . . , n − 1, 0, . . . , k − 1. B sets Ri+1 = ci+1 , θi+1 =
e(g ri H1 (IDi )−ci , g)e(Wici , U ) and adds (Lj , mj , θi+1 , Ri+1 ) into the list
LH2 .
– B selects rk ∈R Z∗q that (Lj , mj , θk ) is not in the list LH2 , where θk =
e(g rk H1 (IDk )−ck , g)e(Wkck , U ). Sets R = ck+1 and adds (Lj , mj , θk , R)
into the list LH2 .
– Returns the signature σ = (c0 , r0 , r1 , . . . , rn−1 ).
Forgery: AI forges a signature of a message m∗ after queries. Let σ ∗ = (c∗0 , r0∗ , r1∗ , . . . ,
∗
rn−1
) be a forgery signature generated by fake witnesses. According to the forkSn−1
Sn−1
{Wi∗ }) outputs true and
{IDi∗ }, i=0
ing lemma [PS96], if the Verify(m∗ , σ ∗ , i=0
S
∗
∗
( n−1
i=0 {IDi }, m ) is never used in queries, B can get another valid forgery. B re-

plays AI with the same random tape but the different H2 . Suppose the two H2
outputs h and h0 respectively, which h 6= h0 . Let the second forgery be σ ∗0 =
∗0 ∗0
∗0
(c∗0
0 , r0 , r1 , . . . , rn−1 ). B thus gets

∗
∗
∗ ∗


 rk = αk − sk ck ,



 r∗0 = α∗ − s∗ c∗0 .
k
k
k k
Then B can solve the k+1 exponent problem (k=3) as the following equations hold:
s∗k =

rk∗ − rk∗0
,
∗
c∗0
k − ck
∗ 2

W ∗ = g auk a V
3

ga =

W ∗V
u∗k

s∗
k
y

,

−s∗
k
y

.

Probability: Let the event that a T ype I attacker outputs a valid forgery be forge.
Let event that B successfully completes a simulation be sim. The probability 0 of
B to solve the k+1 exponent problem is bounded as
0 ≥ Pr[forge ∧ sim] = Pr[forge] · Pr[sim].
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In this game, there are two cases that B aborts a simulation. The probability of
each case is as follows:
• The probability that B does not abort during witness queries is (1 − p)qw .
• The probability that B does not abort during signature queries is (1 − pn )qs .
Since we have Pr[forge] = , the probability 0 is
0 ≥ (1 − p)qw · (1 − pn )qs · p
≥ (1 − p)qw +qs p.
Let te xp be the running time of one exponentiation on a group and tp a be the
running time of one bilinear pairing operation. We have the running time of B is
t0 ≤ t + (q1 + (3n − 1)qs + 3qw )tpa + 2(n − 1)qs texp .

4.4.2

Game 2 Security

Theorem 4.2 Our SCR signature scheme is (t, q1 , qp , qs , )-secure against Type II
attack if the DL problem is (t0 , 0 )-hard, where
0 = , t0 ≤ t + (q1 + 2qp + (3n − 2)qs )texp + (qp + 2(n − 1)qs )tpa .
Here, q1 is number of queries on H1 hash function, texp is the running time of
one exponentiation on a group and tpa is the running time of one bilinear paring
operation.
Proof: Suppose there exists a Type II attacker who can (t, qp , qs , )-break our selfcertified ring signature scheme. We construct an algorithm B run by the challenger
to solve the DL problem. The algorithm B receives the instance (g, g a ) of DL problem
and aims to outputs a using the algorithm AII . The interaction between B and AII
is as follows.
y

Setup: In Game 2, B randomly chooses x, y ∈R Z∗q and sets (U, V ) = (g x , g x ),
where (x, y) are master secret keys. Then it gives (x, y) and Params to AII . B
creates and maintains three lists LH1 = {(ID, u)}, LH2 = {(L, m, θ, R)} and LK =
{(ID, P K, Q, s)}, which are initially empty.
H1 Query: AII can query the result of H1 on IDi at most q1 times, where 1 ≤ i ≤ q1 .
If IDi is in LH1 , H1 (IDi ) is returned. Otherwise, B returns H1 (IDi ) = g ui , where
ui ∈R Z∗q and adds (IDi , ui ) to LH1 .
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H2 Query: AII can query the result of H2 on input (Lj , mj , θj ) at most q2 times,
where θj ∈ G2 and 1 ≤ j ≤ q2 . If (Lj , mj , θj ) is in LH2 , H2 (Lj ||mj ||θj ) will be
returned as the answer. Otherwise, B sets H2 (Lj ||mj ||θj ) = Rj , where Rj ∈R Z∗q .
Then, B responds Rj and adds (Lj , mj , θj , Rj ) into LH2 .
Queries:
• Public-key-Query: AII can query the public key P Ki and the corresponding
proof of knowledge of private key Qi on input IDi at most qp times that
1 ≤ i ≤ qp . B responds the query and maintains the list LK as follows:
– If IDi is in the list LK , B returns the corresponding P Ki and Qi .
– Otherwise, B randomly chooses a number si ∈R Z∗q and sets (P Ki , Qi ) =
(e(g si xa , g), g si ya ). Then, B returns (P Ki , Qi ) to AII and adds (IDi ,
P Ki , Qi , si ) into the list LK .
• Signature-Query: AII can query a signature on inputs (mj ,

Sn−1
j=0

IDj ,

Sn−1
j=0

Wj )

at most qs times where 1 ≤ j ≤ qs . Since the B responds a signature query as
follows:
– Chooses an index k ∈R {0, . . . , n − 1}.
– Selects α ∈R Z∗q and computes ck+1 = H2 (Lj ||mj ||e(g, g)α ), where Lj =
ID0 ||ID1 || . . . ||IDn−1 . If ck+1 is in the list LH2 , B repeats this step.
– Selects ri ∈R Z∗q and computes
ci+1 = H2 (Lj ||mj ||e(g ri H1 (IDi )−ci , g)e(Wici , U )),
where i = k + 1, . . . , n − 1, 0, . . . , k − 1. B sets Ri+1 = ci+1 , θi+1 =
e(g ri H1 (IDi )−ci , g)e(Wici , U ) and adds (Lj , mj , θi+1 , Ri+1 ) into the list
LH 2 .
– B selects rk ∈R Z∗q that (Lj , mj , θk ) is not in the list LH2 , where θk =
e(g rk H1 (IDk )−ck , P )e(Wkck , U ). Sets R = ck+1 and adds (Lj , mj , θk , R)
into the list LH2 .
– Returns the signature σ = (c0 , r0 , r1 , . . . , rn−1 ).
Forgery: AII forges a signature of a message m∗ after queries. Let σ ∗ = (c∗0 , r0∗ , r1∗ , . . . ,
S
Sn−1
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
rn−1
) be a forgery signature generated by ( n−1
i=0 {IDi },
i=0 {Wi }). If Verify(σ , m ,
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i=0

{IDi∗ },
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i=0
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{Wi∗ }) outputs true and the pair that (

Sn−1
i=0

{IDi∗ }, m∗ ) is never

queried to B, then B can apply the forking lemma. B replays the same random tape
but different H2 . Suppose the two different H2 outputs h and h0 respectively. B
∗0 ∗0
∗0
can use the algorithm AII to get another valid forgery σ ∗0 = (c∗0
0 , r0 , r1 , . . . , rn−1 ).

Hence, B can solve the DL problem as follows:
s∗k =

rk∗ − rk∗0
,
∗
c∗0
k − ck

a = (sk x)−1

rk∗ − rk∗0
.
∗
c∗0
k − ck

Probability: Since there is no case that B aborts the simulation, the probability
of B is 0 = . We denote as te xp the running time of one exponentiation and
tp a the running time of one paring operation. The total running time of B is t0 ≤
t + (q1 + 2qp + (3n − 2)qs )texp + (qp + 2(n − 1)qs )tpa .

4.4.3

SCR Anonymity

Theorem 4.3 Our self-certified ring signature scheme is (t, qs , )-anonymous.
Proof:

To prove the anonymity of our SCR signature scheme, we are aiming to

show that there is no PPT algorithm that has non-negligible advantage to find the
actual signer of the given signature. Suppose there is a powerful adversary Ap who
S
has a set of private keys n−1
i=0 si and the corresponding witnesses of identities, we
construct an algorithm B run by C to interact with Ap as follows:
Setup: In Game 3, taking as input a security parameter λ, B returns Params and
master secret key (x, y). B gives Params to Ap .
Sn−1
S
Sn−1
Query: Ap queries a signature on inputs (mi , i=0
{IDi }, n−1
i=0 {Wi }, i=0 {si }) at
most qs times that 1 ≤ i ≤ qs , B randomly chooses a user j to be the actual signer,
where j ∈R {0, . . . , n − 1}, and returns to Ap a signature using SCR signature
scheme.
Guess: Ap chooses a message m∗ and a set of identities
∗

before. It gets a signature σ =
rj∗

=

αj∗

−

s∗j c∗j ,

Because of

αj∗

∈R Z∗q .
that ri∗ , i ∈

∗
(c∗0 , r0∗ , . . . , rj∗ , . . . , rn−1
)

Sn−1
i=0

{IDi } which is used

from B. Hence, we have

Then Ap tries to output the index of actual signer j.
{0, . . . , n − 1} is randomly chosen from Z∗q , any user in T ∗

has the same probability to get the same random tape. It seems that the signer’s rj∗
is not randomly selected, but it is generated by a random value αj∗ ∈R Z∗q . Therefore,
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they are all random to the adversary. Moreover, for any user k ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1}\{j},
there is a number αk∗ ∈ Z∗q that lets rk∗ = αk∗ − s∗k c∗k and makes the same signature.
Therefore, the advantage of Ap is
 ≤ 2−λ ,
which is negligible. We have proved Theorem 3.

4.5

Conclusion

In this chapter, we proposed a new notion, Self-Certified Ring Signature (SCRS).
It solved the private key escrow and certificate management problems. Since our
scheme embedded the public key into the witness, it reduces the cost of storage,
communication and computation. We compared it with two related schemes: certificateless ring signatures and certificate-based ring signatures. Our SCRS is better
due to shorter key size and lower setup cost. We proposed a precise definition of
self-certified ring signatures and provided a concrete scheme. Our scheme has been
proven secure.

Chapter 5
Conclusion
In this thesis, we studied the notion of self-certified digital signatures. It aims to
resolve the certificate management problem and key escrow problem in traditional
PKI-based digital signatures and identity-based signatures respectively. In a selfcertified signature scheme, a trusted third party who generates witnesses for users
has been employed. Equipped with a valid witness, anyone who accepts public
parameters of the witness issuer and an identity of the witness holder can explicitly
recover the holder’s genuine public key. Actually, a self-certified signature scheme
embeds the public key verification process into a signature verification. That is,
once a signature is valid, it implies that the relationship between a user’s identity
and a public key is successfully authenticated.
In Chapter 1, we reviewed the concept of digital signatures. The validity of a
user’s identity and his/her public key is provided by checking the public key certificate. Since traditional PKI needs certificates, certificate management becomes an
inherent problem. We presented several existing solutions of this issue and compared
their advantages and disadvantages. Some related work of this thesis is briefly reviewed in this chapter, including identity-based signatures, certificateless signatures,
certificate-based signatures, online/offline signatures and ring signatures, etc.
Different types of digital signature schemes were formally defined in Chapter 2,
such as, self-certified signature schemes, certificate-based signature schemes and ring
signature schemes. In addition, some mathematical definitions and underlying hard
problems were also given.
In Chapter 3, we described an efficient construction of self-certified signature with
batch verification. A formal definition of self-certified digital signature schemes is
presented along with a security model. According to the security levels for selfcertified signatures defined in [Gir91], we specified two types of adversaries. Our
proposed scheme is proved to be secure against both attacks. Comparing with
60
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existing certificateless and certificate-based signature schemes which have the same
purpose as self-certified signatures, our construction is more efficient since it captures
two features. The signing process requires only one multiplicative calculation with
pre-computation. The scheme naturally provides the property of batch verification.
Especially, bilinear pairing computations in multi-signer setting are independent of
the size of the set. Along with the features of self-certified signatures, our scheme is
suited for restricted computing power and low bandwidth communications in multiuser environment.
In Chapter 4, we introduced the first construction of self-certified ring signature
scheme. The notion of self-certified ring signatures is extended from the conception
of self-certified signatures and ring signatures. Meanwhile, a formal definition of selfcertified signature schemes has been presented along with its security requirements.
Our proposed scheme is based on a generic construction of ring signature schemes in
[AOS02] and secure against two types of attacks in the random oracle model. The
security proof depends on the hardness of k+1EP and Discrete Logarithm problem.
Additionally, a property of perfect anonymity is also provided. Since public key
certificates are unnecessary in our scheme, it can be efficiently used in large scale
applications.
Both of our proposed schemes capture all features of original self-certified signatures and the strongest security notion. They prevent both certificate management
problem and key escrow problem. The cost for communications has also been reduced.
Future work: Many digital signature schemes based on self-certified public keys
have been proposed. Unfortunately, all were proved secure under the random oracle model based on strong assumptions. In my future research, I will construct a
provably secure self-certified digital signature scheme without random oracles under
weak complexity assumptions.
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Jean-Sébastien Coron, Jacques Patarin, and Yannick Seurin. The random oracle model and the ideal cipher model are equivalent. In David
Wagner, editor, CRYPTO, volume 5157 of LNCS, pages 1–20. Springer,
2008.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

[CS97]

65

Jan Camenisch and Markus Stadler. Efficient group signature schemes
for large groups (extended abstract). In Burton S. Kaliski Jr., editor,
CRYPTO, volume 1294 of LNCS, pages 410–424. Springer, 1997.

[CvH91]

David Chaum and Eugène van Heyst. Group signatures. In EUROCRYPT, volume 547 of LNCS, pages 257–265. Springer, 1991.

[CWMZ09] Shuang Chang, Duncan S. Wong, Yi Mu, and Zhenfeng Zhang. Certificateless threshold ring signature. Inf. Sci., 179(20):3685–3696, 2009.
[CY07]

Sherman S.M. Chow and Wun-She Yap.
natures.

Certificateless ring sig-

In Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2007/236, 2007.

http://eprint.iacr.org/2007/236/, 2007.
[CYH05]

Sherman S.M. Chow, S.M. Yiu, and Lucas C.K. Hui. Efficient identity
based ring signature. In John Ioannidis, Angelos D. Keromytis, and
Moti Yung, editors, ACNS ’05, volume 3531 of LNCS, pages 499–512.
Springer, 2005.

[Dam87]
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